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Abuse of administrative power to restrict competition in China: four reflections, two ideas and a thought

In: The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law

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  • Mel Marquis

Abstract

This book focuses on experiences with the Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) of 2007 in China. It uses carefully-chosen case studies to examine how the competition authorities in China discuss cases and how they use economic reasoning in their decision-making process.

Suggested Citation

  • Mel Marquis, 2013. "Abuse of administrative power to restrict competition in China: four reflections, two ideas and a thought," Chapters, in: Michael Faure & Xinzhu Zhang (ed.), The Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, chapter 2, pages 73-141, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    • Handle: RePEc:elg:eechap:14825_2
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    References listed on IDEAS

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