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Oligopsony Power, Asset Specificity, and Hold-Up: Evidence from the Broiler Industry

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  • Tomislav Vukina
  • Porametr Leegomonchai

Abstract

In this article we look for empirical evidence of hold-up in broiler industry production contracts by using the cross-sectional national survey of broiler growers. First, we focus on the problem of under-investment and hypothesize that the degree of agent's (grower's) under-investment systematically depends on the principal's (integrator's) market power and the level of asset specificity. Second, we provide an indirect test of hold-up by looking at the grower contract payoffs as a function of the frequency of the housing facilities upgrade requests and the principal's market power. The results show moderate empirical support for the presence of hold-up. Copyright 2006, Oxford University Press.

Suggested Citation

  • Tomislav Vukina & Porametr Leegomonchai, 2006. "Oligopsony Power, Asset Specificity, and Hold-Up: Evidence from the Broiler Industry," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(3), pages 589-605.
    • Handle: RePEc:oup:ajagec:v:88:y:2006:i:3:p:589-605
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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1111/j.1467-8276.2006.00881.x
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    1. T. Davids & F.H. Meyer, 2017. "Price formation and competitiveness of the South African broiler industry in the global context," Agrekon, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 56(2), pages 123-138, April.
    2. Key, Nigel, 2013. "Production Contracts and Farm Business Growth and Survival," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 45(2), pages 277-293, May.
    3. Shufen Tang & Yuqing Zheng & Taiping Li & Li Zhou, 2021. "The hold‐up problem in China's broiler industry: Empirical evidence from Jiangsu Province," Canadian Journal of Agricultural Economics/Revue canadienne d'agroeconomie, Canadian Agricultural Economics Society/Societe canadienne d'agroeconomie, vol. 69(4), pages 539-554, December.
    4. Yang, Yadi, 2021. "Experiments on the hold-up problem and delegation," Other publications TiSEM b564ed18-ab0b-4eb1-8188-3, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. Key, Nigel D. & MacDonald, James M., 2008. "Local Monopsony Power in the Market for Broilers - Evidence from a Farm Survey," 2008 Annual Meeting, July 27-29, 2008, Orlando, Florida 6073, American Agricultural Economics Association (New Name 2008: Agricultural and Applied Economics Association).
    6. Muller Paul & Böhm Michael & Csillag Péter & Donati Michele & Drut Marion & Ferrer-Pérez Hugo & Gauvrit Lisa & Gil Jose M. & Hoang Viet & Malak-Rawlikowska Agata & Mattas Konstadinos & Napasintuwong O, 2021. "Are Certified Supply Chains More Socially Sustainable? A Bargaining Power Analysis," Journal of Agricultural & Food Industrial Organization, De Gruyter, vol. 19(2), pages 177-192, December.
    7. Torero, Maximo & Viceisza, Angelino C.G., 2016. "Potential collusion and trust: Evidence from a field experiment in Vietnam," African Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, African Association of Agricultural Economists, vol. 11(1), pages 1-11.
    8. Hu, Y. & Hendrikse, G.W.J., 2007. "Allocation of Decision Rights in Fruit and Vegetable Contracts in China," ERIM Report Series Research in Management ERS-2007-077-ORG, Erasmus Research Institute of Management (ERIM), ERIM is the joint research institute of the Rotterdam School of Management, Erasmus University and the Erasmus School of Economics (ESE) at Erasmus University Rotterdam.
    9. Saenger, Christoph & Torero, Maximo & Qaim, Matin, 2016. "Impact of third-party enforcement of contracts in agricultural markets—A field experiment in Vietnam," IFPRI book chapters, in: Devaux, André & Torero, Maximo & Donovan, Jason & Horton, Douglas E. (ed.), Innovation for inclusive value-chain development: Successes and challenges, chapter 11, pages 343-374, International Food Policy Research Institute (IFPRI).
    10. Qiwen Sheng & Tomislav Vukina, 2024. "Public Communication as a Mechanism for Collusion in the Broiler Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 64(1), pages 57-91, February.
    11. Mao, Hui & Zhou, Li & Ifft, Jennifer & Ying, RuiYao, 2019. "Risk preferences, production contracts and technology adoption by broiler farmers in China," China Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 147-159.
    12. Yukichika Kawata, 2011. "Extended Model of the Natural Resource Input-Output Market: Game Meat in Latvia as an Example," South-Eastern Europe Journal of Economics, Association of Economic Universities of South and Eastern Europe and the Black Sea Region, vol. 9(2), pages 167-185.
    13. Kostas Karantininis & Jesper T. Graversen, 2008. "Relational contracts and adaptation: application to a pork producer contract," Agribusiness, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 24(3), pages 342-354.
    14. Hou, Jing & Chen, Feiyu, 2020. "Private Enforcement Mechanisms and Contract Stability in Agri-food Supply Chain: An Empirical Evidence from China," 2020 Annual Meeting, July 26-28, Kansas City, Missouri 304586, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    15. Mérel, Pierre & Sexton, Richard J., 2017. "Buyer power with atomistic upstream entry: Can downstream consolidation increase production and welfare?," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 50(C), pages 259-293.
    16. Mao, Hui & Zhou, Li & Ifft, Jennifer, 2017. "Risk Preferences, Contracts and Technology Adoption by Broiler Farmers in China," 2017 Annual Meeting, July 30-August 1, Chicago, Illinois 257248, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
    17. Hammond, Robert G. & Zheng, Xiaoyong, 2013. "Heterogeneity in tournaments with incomplete information: An experimental analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 31(3), pages 248-260.
    18. Erkal, Nisvan, 2007. "Buyer-supplier interaction, asset specificity, and product choice," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 25(5), pages 988-1010, October.
    19. Stephen F. Hamilton & David L. Sunding, 2021. "Joint Oligopsony‐Oligopoly Power in Food Processing Industries: Application to the us Broiler Industry," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 103(4), pages 1398-1413, August.
    20. Steven Y. Wu, 2010. "Producer Protection Legislation and Termination Damages in the Presence of Contracting Frictions," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 92(1), pages 28-41.
    21. MacDonald, James M. & Key, Nigel D., 2012. "Market Power in Poultry Production Contracting? Evidence from a Farm Survey," Journal of Agricultural and Applied Economics, Southern Agricultural Economics Association, vol. 44(4), pages 1-14, November.
    22. Jing Hou & Linhai Wu & Bo Hou, 2020. "Risk Attitude, Contract Arrangements and Enforcement in Food Safety Governance: A China’s Agri-Food Supply Chain Scenario," IJERPH, MDPI, vol. 17(8), pages 1-16, April.
    23. Hueth, Brent & Ligon, Ethan & Dimitri, Carolyn, 2007. "AJAE Appendix: Agricultural Contracts: Data and Research Needs," American Journal of Agricultural Economics APPENDICES, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 89(5), pages 1-7, December.
    24. Clark Lundberg & Tristan Skolrud & Bahram Adrangi & Arjun Chatrath, 2021. "Oil Price Pass through to Agricultural Commodities†," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 103(2), pages 721-742, March.

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