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The Results of the Fiscal Control Activity in the Member States of the European Union in the field of VAT

Author

Listed:
  • Genifera Banica

    (University of Craiova)

  • Maria Dana Banica

    (University of Craiova)

Abstract

The article presents an analysis of the influence that the results of the control activity obtained by the Member States had on the value-added tax. An important part of the work is dedicated to the activity of international fiscal control due to international cooperation resulting from cross-border economic activities. Analyzing the budgetary control activity carried out by the 28 member states of the European Union during 6 consecutive years, a series of similarities and differences can be noted both in terms of the implementation method and the results obtained. Among the financial obligations taxpayers owe, the proposed econometric analysis focuses on the value-added tax. Thus, to carry out the econometric analysis, we used the dependent variable: VAT related to fiscal revenues, and as an independent variable: additional VAT established, as a result of fiscal control, against the total of additional budgetary obligations resulting from fiscal control activity. The result indicates a statistically valid linear regression model, whereby a percentage increase in the value-added tax established by the tax control activity leads to a 0.14% increase in the total tax revenues collected.

Suggested Citation

  • Genifera Banica & Maria Dana Banica, 2024. "The Results of the Fiscal Control Activity in the Member States of the European Union in the field of VAT," Economic Alternatives, University of National and World Economy, Sofia, Bulgaria, issue 4, pages 701-721, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:nwe:eajour:y:2024:i:4:p:701-721
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    fiscal inspection; additional tax obligations; government performance; TVA;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • G20 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - General
    • G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government

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