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Tax evasion as a contagion game: evidences from an agent-based model

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  • Letizia S. Di Mauro

    (University of Catania and INFN Sezione di Catania)

  • Alessandro Pluchino

    (University of Catania and INFN Sezione di Catania)

  • Alessio E. Biondo

    (University of Catania)

Abstract

This paper presents an agent-based model of a simple economic system where the personal satisfaction gained from public services and the perceived opinion of neighbors are shown to drive the individual decision about tax compliance. Results of simulations, consistent with existing literature on the topic, suggest a peculiar approach to face the plague of tax evasion. Graphical abstract

Suggested Citation

  • Letizia S. Di Mauro & Alessandro Pluchino & Alessio E. Biondo, 2019. "Tax evasion as a contagion game: evidences from an agent-based model," The European Physical Journal B: Condensed Matter and Complex Systems, Springer;EDP Sciences, vol. 92(5), pages 1-12, May.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:eurphb:v:92:y:2019:i:5:d:10.1140_epjb_e2019-90722-9
    DOI: 10.1140/epjb/e2019-90722-9
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Annette Alstadsæter & Niels Johannesen & Gabriel Zucman, 2019. "Tax Evasion and Inequality," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 109(6), pages 2073-2103, June.
    2. Traxler, Christian, 2010. "Social norms and conditional cooperative taxpayers," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 26(1), pages 89-103, March.
    3. Panayiotis Nicolaides, 2014. "Tax Compliance Social Norms and Institutional Quality: An Evolutionary Theory of Public Good Provision," Taxation Papers 46, Directorate General Taxation and Customs Union, European Commission.
    4. Slemrod, Joel & Yitzhaki, Shlomo, 2002. "Tax avoidance, evasion, and administration," Handbook of Public Economics, in: A. J. Auerbach & M. Feldstein (ed.), Handbook of Public Economics, edition 1, volume 3, chapter 22, pages 1423-1470, Elsevier.
    5. Traxler, Christian, 2006. "Tax Evasion, Social Norms and Conditional Cooperation," Munich Dissertations in Economics 4951, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
    6. Kirchler,Erich, 2007. "The Economic Psychology of Tax Behaviour," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521876742, January.
    7. Richard Vale, 2015. "A Model for Tax Evasion with Some Realistic Properties," Papers 1508.02476, arXiv.org.
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    Cited by:

    1. Lucy Wanjuhi Ng’ang’a & Martin Oleche Ouma, 2023. "Effect of Tax Evasion on Revenue Collected at Customs, Border and Control Department of Kenya Revenue Authority," International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science, International Journal of Research and Innovation in Social Science (IJRISS), vol. 7(10), pages 1994-2003, October.
    2. Genifera Claudia Bănică & Klejda Gabeshi, 2021. "Organization Of Fiscal Control-International Comparisons," Management Strategies Journal, Constantin Brancoveanu University, vol. 51(1), pages 15-24.

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