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A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Childhood Vaccination Behavior: Nash versus Kant

Author

Listed:
  • Philippe De Donder
  • Roberto Vélez
  • Stefan Penczynski
  • John E. Roemer
  • Humberto Llavador

Abstract

The vaccination game exhibits positive externalities. The standard game-theoretic approach assumes that parents make decisions according to the Nash protocol, which is individualistic and non-cooperative. However, in more solidaristic societies, parents may behave cooperatively, optimizing according to the Kantian protocol, in which the equilibrium is efficient. We develop a random utility model of vaccination behavior and prove that the equilibrium coverage rate is larger with the Kant protocol than with the Nash one. Using survey data collected from six countries, we calibrate the parameters of the vaccination game, compute both Nash equilibrium and Kantian equilibrium profiles, and compare them with observed vaccination behavior. We find evidence that parents demonstrate cooperative behavior in all six countries. We argue that the existence of positive externalities has fostered a social norm, leading to higher vaccination rates than predicted by individualistic decision-making, and that the Kantian equilibrium offers one precise version of such social norm. The study highlights the importance of cooperation and social norms in shaping vaccination behavior and underscores the need to consider these factors in public health interventions.

Suggested Citation

  • Philippe De Donder & Roberto Vélez & Stefan Penczynski & John E. Roemer & Humberto Llavador, 2021. "A Game-Theoretic Analysis of Childhood Vaccination Behavior: Nash versus Kant," Working Papers 1305, Barcelona School of Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:bge:wpaper:1305
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Charles A. Holt & Susan K. Laury, 2002. "Risk Aversion and Incentive Effects," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 92(5), pages 1644-1655, December.
    2. Christopher Avery & William Bossert & Adam Clark & Glenn Ellison & Sara Fisher Ellison, 2020. "An Economist's Guide to Epidemiology Models of Infectious Disease," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 34(4), pages 79-104, Fall.
    3. James Alm, 2019. "What Motivates Tax Compliance?," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 353-388, April.
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    Cited by:

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    2. Gregory Ponthiere, 2024. "Epictetusian rationality and evolutionary stability," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 647-673, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Nash equilibrium; Kantian equilibrium; vaccination; social norm; free-rider problem;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
    • D62 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Externalities
    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • I12 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Behavior

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