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Structural Econometrics of Auctions: A Review

Author

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  • Gentry, Matthew L.
  • Hubbard, Timothy P.
  • Nekipelov, Denis
  • Paarsch, Harry J.

Abstract

We review the literature concerned with the structural econometrics of observational data from auctions, discussing the problems that have been solved and highlighting those that remain unsolved as well as suggesting areas for future research. Where appropriate, we discuss different modeling choices as well as the fragility or robustness of different methods.

Suggested Citation

  • Gentry, Matthew L. & Hubbard, Timothy P. & Nekipelov, Denis & Paarsch, Harry J., 2018. "Structural Econometrics of Auctions: A Review," Foundations and Trends(R) in Econometrics, now publishers, vol. 9(2-4), pages 79-302, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:now:fnteco:0800000031
    DOI: 10.1561/0800000031
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Hal R. Varian & Christopher Harris, 2014. "The VCG Auction in Theory and Practice," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 104(5), pages 442-445, May.
    2. Robert Wilson, 1977. "A Bidding Model of Perfect Competition," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 44(3), pages 511-518.
    3. Ye, Lixin, 2007. "Indicative bidding and a theory of two-stage auctions," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(1), pages 181-207, January.
    4. William Vickrey, 1961. "Counterspeculation, Auctions, And Competitive Sealed Tenders," Journal of Finance, American Finance Association, vol. 16(1), pages 8-37, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Weichselbaumer, Michael, 2024. "Competition after mergers near review thresholds," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 94(C).
    2. Enache, Andreea & Florens, Jean-Pierre & Sbai, Erwann, 2023. "A functional estimation approach to the first-price auction models," Journal of Econometrics, Elsevier, vol. 235(2), pages 1564-1588.
    3. Jun Ma & Vadim Marmer & Artyom Shneyerov & Pai Xu, 2021. "Monotonicity-constrained nonparametric estimation and inference for first-price auctions," Econometric Reviews, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 40(10), pages 944-982, November.
    4. Ivaldi, Marc & Petrova, Milena & Urdanoz, Miguel, 2022. "Airline cooperation effects on airfare distribution: An auction-model-based approach," Transport Policy, Elsevier, vol. 115(C), pages 239-250.
    5. Myrna, Olena, 2023. "Competition in online land lease auctions in Ukraine: Reduced-form estimation," Land Use Policy, Elsevier, vol. 125(C).
    6. Dutra, Renato Cabral Dias & Carpio, Lucio Guido Tapia, 2021. "Biodiesel auctions in Brazil: Symmetry of bids and informational paradigm," Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews, Elsevier, vol. 137(C).
    7. Sebastian Galiani & Juan Pantano, 2021. "Structural Models: Inception and Frontier," NBER Working Papers 28698, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    8. Ivaldi, Marc & Petrova, Milena J & Urdanoz, Miguel, 2021. "Airline Cooperation Effects on Airfare Distribution: An Auction-model-based Approach," TSE Working Papers 21-1259, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
    9. Yoav Kolumbus & Joe Halpern & 'Eva Tardos, 2024. "Paying to Do Better: Games with Payments between Learning Agents," Papers 2405.20880, arXiv.org.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Auctions; Structural econometrics;

    JEL classification:

    • C57 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Econometric Modeling - - - Econometrics of Games and Auctions
    • D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions

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