Issues and Types of Adverse Selection and Negative Selection
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
Download full text from publisher
References listed on IDEAS
- Lambsdorff, Johann Graf, 2002. "Corruption and Rent-Seeking," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 113(1-2), pages 97-125, October.
- Giovanni Dosi & Richard R. Nelson, 2000.
"An Introduction to Evolutionary Theories in Economics,"
Chapters, in: Innovation, Organization and Economic Dynamics, chapter 11, pages 327-346,
Edward Elgar Publishing.
- Dosi, Giovanni & Nelson, Richard R, 1994. "An Introduction to Evolutionary Theories in Economics," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 4(3), pages 153-172, September.
- János Kornai, 2009.
"The soft budget constraint syndrome in the hospital sector,"
Society and Economy, Akadémiai Kiadó, Hungary, vol. 31(1), pages 5-31, June.
- János Kornai, 2009. "The soft budget constraint syndrome in the hospital sector," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 9(2), pages 117-135, June.
- Kornai, J?nos, 2008. "The soft budget constraint syndrome in the hospital sector," RRC Working Paper Series Special_Issue, Russian Research Center, Institute of Economic Research, Hitotsubashi University.
- Mussa, Michael & Rosen, Sherwin, 1978. "Monopoly and product quality," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 18(2), pages 301-317, August.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, 2005.
"Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth?,"
Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(1), pages 69-97, January.
- Pierre-Guillaume Méon & Khalid Sekkat, 2005. "Does corruption grease or sand the wheels of growth?," ULB Institutional Repository 2013/7364, ULB -- Universite Libre de Bruxelles.
- Diansheng Dong & Atanu Saha, 1998. "He came, he saw, (and) he waited: an empirical analysis of inertia in technology adoption," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(7), pages 893-905.
- Solow, Robert M., 1979. "Another possible source of wage stickiness," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 1(1), pages 79-82.
- Major, Iván, 2014. "Ha elfogy a bizalom... Kialakítható-e optimális mechanizmus kétoldalú aszimmetrikus információ esetén? [When confidence evaporates&. Does optimal mechanism design exist under doubly asymmetric info," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 148-165.
- Samuelson, William & Zeckhauser, Richard, 1988. "Status Quo Bias in Decision Making," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 1(1), pages 7-59, March.
- Narloch, Ulf & Pascual, Unai & Drucker, Adam G., 2012. "Collective Action Dynamics under External Rewards: Experimental Insights from Andean Farming Communities," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 2096-2107.
- Paul Milgrom., 1987.
"Adverse Selection without Hidden Information,"
Economics Working Papers
8742, University of California at Berkeley.
- Milgrom, Paul, 1987. "Adverse Selection Without Hidden Information," Department of Economics, Working Paper Series qt62t1w8hf, Department of Economics, Institute for Business and Economic Research, UC Berkeley.
- Laffont, Jean-Jacques & Tirole, Jean, 1988.
"The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 56(5), pages 1153-1175, September.
- Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, 1985. "The Dynamics of Incentive Contracts," Working papers 397, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
- Guriev, Sergei, 2004.
"Red tape and corruption,"
Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 489-504, April.
- Guriev, Sergei, 2003. "Red Tape and Corruption," CEPR Discussion Papers 3972, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Sergei Guriev, 2004. "Red tape and corruption," Post-Print hal-03595530, HAL.
- Sergei Guriev, 2004. "Red tape and corruption," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-03595530, HAL.
- John Vickers, 2005. "Abuse of Market Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 115(504), pages 244-261, June.
- Greif,Avner, 2006.
"Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy,"
Cambridge Books,
Cambridge University Press, number 9780521671347, September.
- Greif,Avner, 2006. "Institutions and the Path to the Modern Economy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521480444, January.
- George A. Akerlof, 1970. "The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 84(3), pages 488-500.
- Jean Tirole, 2016.
"From Bottom of the Barrel to Cream of the Crop: Sequential Screening With Positive Selection,"
Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84, pages 1291-1343, July.
- Jean Tirole, 2016. "From Bottom of the Barrel to Cream of the Crop: Sequential Screening With Positive Selection," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 84(4), pages 1291-1343, July.
- Tirole, Jean, 2016. "From Bottom of the Barrel to Cream of the Crop: Sequential Screening with Positive Selection," TSE Working Papers 16-672, Toulouse School of Economics (TSE).
- János Kornai, 2010. "Innovation and dynamism," The Economics of Transition, The European Bank for Reconstruction and Development, vol. 18(4), pages 629-670, October.
- Hillman, Arye L & Katz, Eliakim, 1984. "Risk-Averse Rent Seekers and the Social Cost of Monopoly Power," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 94(373), pages 104-110, March.
- Pindyck, Robert S, 1985.
"The Measurement of Monopoly Power in Dynamic Markets,"
Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 28(1), pages 193-222, April.
- Pindyck, Robert S., 1984. "The measurement of monopoly power in dynamic markets," Working papers 1540-84., Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management.
- Freeman, Edward & Liedtka, Jeanne, 1997. "Stakeholder capitalism and the value chain," European Management Journal, Elsevier, vol. 15(3), pages 286-296, June.
- Michael Rothschild & Joseph Stiglitz, 1976. "Equilibrium in Competitive Insurance Markets: An Essay on the Economics of Imperfect Information," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 90(4), pages 629-649.
- Bester, Helmut, 1985. "Screening vs. Rationing in Credit Markets with Imperfect Information," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 75(4), pages 850-855, September.
- Rey, Patrick & Salanie, Bernard, 1996. "On the Value of Commitment with Asymmetric Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1395-1414, November.
- Stiglitz, Joseph E., 1986. "The new development economics," World Development, Elsevier, vol. 14(2), pages 257-265, February.
- Michael Spence, 1973. "Job Market Signaling," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 87(3), pages 355-374.
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Anastasios Dosis, 2019.
"Interest Rates and Investment Under Competitive Screening and Moral Hazard,"
Working Papers
hal-02130434, HAL.
- Anastasios, Dosis, 2019. "Interest Rates and Investment Under Competitive Screening and Moral Hazard," ESSEC Working Papers WP1902, ESSEC Research Center, ESSEC Business School.
- Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991.
"Adverse Selection in Insurance Markets: a Selective Survey,"
Cahiers de recherche
9105, Universite de Montreal, Departement de sciences economiques.
- Dionne, G. & Doherty, N., 1991. "Adverse Selection In Insurance Markets: A Selective Survey," Cahiers de recherche 9105, Centre interuniversitaire de recherche en économie quantitative, CIREQ.
- Andre Veiga & E. Glen Weyl, 2011. "Multidimensional Heterogeneity and Platform Design," Working Papers 11-33, NET Institute, revised Nov 2011.
- Amy Cutts & Robert Order, 2004. "On the Economics of Subprime Lending," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 167-196, November.
- Dongyuan Zhan & Amy R. Ward, 2019. "Staffing, Routing, and Payment to Trade off Speed and Quality in Large Service Systems," Operations Research, INFORMS, vol. 67(6), pages 1738-1751, November.
- Francois Lantin & Pierre Roy, 2007. "L'impact de la notation financière sur les stratégies de croissance externe," Post-Print halshs-00692570, HAL.
- Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2007.
"Contracting with imperfect commitment and noisy communication,"
Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 136(1), pages 236-259, September.
- Helmut Bester & Roland Strausz, "undated". "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Papers 017, Departmental Working Papers.
- Bester, Helmut & Strausz, Roland, 2003. "Contracting with Imperfect Commitment and Noisy Communication," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 2, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Fabrice Etilé & Sabrina Teyssier, 2012.
"Signaling Corporate Social Responsibility: Third-Party Certification vs. Brands,"
PSE Working Papers
halshs-00736551, HAL.
- Fabrice Etilé & Sabrina Teyssier, 2012. "Signaling Corporate Social Responsibility: Third-Party Certification vs. Brands," Working Papers halshs-00736551, HAL.
- Fabrice Etilé & Sabrina Teyssier, 2012. "Signaling Corporate Social Responsibility: Third-party certification vs. brands," Working Papers hal-02807886, HAL.
- Mark Gertler, 1988.
"Financial structure and aggregate economic activity: an overview,"
Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland, pages 559-596.
- Gertler, Mark, 1988. "Financial Structure and Aggregate Economic Activity: An Overview," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 20(3), pages 559-588, August.
- Mark L. Gertler, 1988. "Financial Structure and Aggregate Economic Activity: An Overview," NBER Working Papers 2559, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Garcia-Villegas, Salomon, 2023.
"The amplification effects of adverse selection in mortgage credit supply,"
Journal of Housing Economics, Elsevier, vol. 62(C).
- Salomón García, 2023. "The amplification effects of adverse selection in mortgage credit suply," Working Papers 2316, Banco de España.
- Puelz, Robert & Snow, Arthur, 1994. "Evidence on Adverse Selection: Equilibrium Signaling and Cross-Subsidization in the Insurance Market," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(2), pages 236-257, April.
- Adam Blandin & John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott, 2016.
"Equilibrium with mutual organizations in adverse selection economies,"
Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 62(1), pages 3-13, June.
- Adam Blandin & John H. Boyd & Edward C. Prescott, 2015. "Equilibrium with Mutual Organizations in Adverse Selection Economies," Working Papers 717, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
- repec:eee:labchp:v:2:y:1986:i:c:p:789-848 is not listed on IDEAS
- Saul Estrin & Susanna Khavul & Mike Wright, 2022.
"Soft and hard information in equity crowdfunding: network effects in the digitalization of entrepreneurial finance,"
Small Business Economics, Springer, vol. 58(4), pages 1761-1781, April.
- Estrin, Saul & Khavul, Susanna & Wright, Mike, 2022. "Soft and hard information in equity crowdfunding: network effects in the digitalization of entrepreneurial finance," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 109808, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
- Panle Jia Barwick & Yanyan Liu & Eleonora Patacchini & Qi Wu, 2023.
"Information, Mobile Communication, and Referral Effects,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 113(5), pages 1170-1207, May.
- Patacchini, Eleonora & Barwick, Panle Jia & Liu, Yanyan & Wu, Qi, 2019. "Information, Mobile Communication, and Referral Effects," CEPR Discussion Papers 13786, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
- Panle Jia Barwick & Yanyan Liu & Eleonora Patacchini & Qi Wu, 2019. "Information, Mobile Communication, and Referral Effects," NBER Working Papers 25873, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Anastasios Dosis, 2016. "An Efficient Mechanism for Competitive Markets with Adverse Selection," Working Papers hal-01282772, HAL.
- Robin Maialeh, 2019. "Generalization of results and neoclassical rationality: unresolved controversies of behavioural economics methodology," Quality & Quantity: International Journal of Methodology, Springer, vol. 53(4), pages 1743-1761, July.
- repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/3018m4nhj18vvr47bolsnnqeqs is not listed on IDEAS
- repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/3018m4nhj18vvr47bolsnnqeqs is not listed on IDEAS
- Sonja Brangewitz & Gaël Giraud, 2012.
"Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Default,"
Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne
12062r, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne, revised Oct 2013.
- Sonja Brangewitz & Gaël Giraud, 2012. "Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Default," Post-Print halshs-00747899, HAL.
- Sonja Brangewitz & Gaël Giraud, 2012. "Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Default," Université Paris1 Panthéon-Sorbonne (Post-Print and Working Papers) halshs-00747899, HAL.
- Sonja Brangewitz & Gaël Giraud, 2012. "Learning by Trading in Infinite Horizon Strategic Market Games with Default," Documents de travail du Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne 12062, Université Panthéon-Sorbonne (Paris 1), Centre d'Economie de la Sorbonne.
- Myerson, Roger, 2001. "Learning Game Theory from John Harsanyi," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 36(1), pages 20-25, July.
- Aristotelis Boukouras & Kostas Koufopoulos, 2017. "Efficient allocations in economies with asymmetric information when the realized frequency of types is common knowledge," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 64(1), pages 75-98, June.
- Holmstrom, Bengt R. & Tirole, Jean, 1989. "The theory of the firm," Handbook of Industrial Organization, in: R. Schmalensee & R. Willig (ed.), Handbook of Industrial Organization, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 2, pages 61-133, Elsevier.
More about this item
Keywords
economic evolution; economic selection; adverse selection; negative selection; market structure; stakeholder theories;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D81 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Criteria for Decision-Making under Risk and Uncertainty
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D92 - Microeconomics - - Micro-Based Behavioral Economics - - - Intertemporal Firm Choice, Investment, Capacity, and Financing
- E32 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Prices, Business Fluctuations, and Cycles - - - Business Fluctuations; Cycles
- L15 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Information and Product Quality
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mnb:finrev:v:18:y:2019:i:2:p:87-116. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Morvay Endre (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/mnbgvhu.html .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.