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On the Economics of Subprime Lending

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  • Amy Cutts
  • Robert Order

Abstract

US mortgage markets have evolved radically in recent years. An important part of the change has been the rise of the “subprime” market, characterized by loans with high default rates, dominance by specialized subprime lenders rather than full-service lenders, and little coverage by the secondary mortgage market. In this paper, we examine these and other “stylized facts” with standard tools used by financial economists to describe market structure in other contexts. We use three models to examine market structure: an option-based approach to mortgage pricing in which we argue that subprime options are different from prime options, causing different contracts and prices; and two models based on asymmetric information–one with asymmetry between borrowers and lenders, and one with the asymmetry between lenders and the secondary market. In both of the asymmetric-information models, investors set up incentives for borrowers or loan sellers to reveal information, primarily through costs of rejection. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media, Inc. 2004

Suggested Citation

  • Amy Cutts & Robert Order, 2004. "On the Economics of Subprime Lending," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 167-196, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:jrefec:v:30:y:2004:i:2:p:167-196
    DOI: 10.1007/s11146-004-4878-9
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Giovanni Dell’Ariccia & Deniz Igan & Luc Laeven, 2012. "Credit Booms and Lending Standards: Evidence from the Subprime Mortgage Market," Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Blackwell Publishing, vol. 44(2‐3), pages 367-384, March.
    2. Philip Bond & David K. Musto & Bilge Yilmaz, 2006. "Predatory lending in rational world," Working Papers 06-2, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia.
    3. Kathe Newman, 2009. "Post‐Industrial Widgets: Capital Flows and the Production of the Urban," International Journal of Urban and Regional Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 33(2), pages 314-331, June.
    4. W. Scott Frame & Lawrence J. White, 2009. "Technological Change, Financial Innovation, and Diffusion in Banking," Working Papers 09-03, New York University, Leonard N. Stern School of Business, Department of Economics.
    5. AKM Rezaul Hossain, 2005. "A Simple Model of Credit Rationing with Information Externalities," Working papers 2005-11, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics.
    6. Wang, Fan, 2007. "Risk-Based Pricing of High Loan-To-Value Mortgage," MPRA Paper 4788, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    7. Geetesh Bhardwaj & Rajdeep Sengupta, 2008. "Did prepayments sustain the subprime market?," Working Papers 2008-039, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    8. Luci Ellis, 2010. "The Housing Meltdown: Why Did It Happen in the United States?," International Real Estate Review, Global Social Science Institute, vol. 13(3), pages 351-394.
    9. Lim, Terence & Lo, Andrew W. & Merton, Robert C. & Scholes, Myron S., 2006. "The Derivatives Sourcebook," Foundations and Trends(R) in Finance, now publishers, vol. 1(5–6), pages 365-572, April.
    10. Elizabeth Laderman & Carolina Reid, 2008. "Lending in low- and moderate-income neighborhoods in California: the performance of CRA lending during the subprime meltdown," Community Development Working Paper 2008-05, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
    11. Geetesh Bhardwaj & Rajdeep Sengupta, 2008. "Where's the smoking gun? a study of underwriting standards for US subprime mortgages," Working Papers 2008-036, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    12. Yuliya Demyanyk & Otto van Hemert, 2007. "Understanding the subprime mortgage crisis," Supervisory Policy Analysis Working Papers 2007-05, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis.
    13. Stephen L. Ross, 2005. "The Continuing Practice and Impact of Discrimination," Working papers 2005-19, University of Connecticut, Department of Economics, revised Jul 2006.
    14. Peter Chinloy & Nancy Macdonald, 2004. "Subprime Lenders and Mortgage Market Completion," The Journal of Real Estate Finance and Economics, Springer, vol. 30(2), pages 153-165, November.
    15. Roberto G. Quercia & Michael A. Stegman & Walter R. Davis, 2007. "The impact of predatory loan terms on subprime foreclosures: The special case of prepayment penalties and balloon payments," Housing Policy Debate, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 18(2), pages 311-346, January.
    16. John Gilderbloom & Katrina Anaker & Gregory Squires & Matt Hanka & Joshua Ambrosius, 2011. "Why Foreclosure Rates in African American Neighborhoods are so High: Looking at the Real Reaonss," ERSA conference papers ersa11p1597, European Regional Science Association.
    17. Yuliya Demyanyk, 2009. "Quick exits of subprime mortgages," Review, Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis, vol. 91(Mar), pages 79-94.

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