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Further evidence on monetary and fiscal policy coordination

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  • Ruby Kishan
  • Timothy Opiela

Abstract

The extent to which fiscal and monetary policies respond to inflation and unemployment and the degree to which policy makers coordinate their policies have important implications for their usefulness as instruments of economic stabilization. Using a framework of minimizing a policy maker's loss function, subject to the state of the economy, this paper tests for the joint determination of monetary and fiscal policies. Our results show that the pre-Reagan/Bush and pre-Volcker/Greenspan eras can be characterized by a noncooperative game between the two policies. For the Reagan/Bush and Volcker/Greenspan regimes, our results are consistent with a cooperative game in which fiscal policy dominates and monetary policy accommodates. Our results also have implications for the possibility of future cooperation by policy makers. Copyright International Atlantic Economic Society 2000

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  • Ruby Kishan & Timothy Opiela, 2000. "Further evidence on monetary and fiscal policy coordination," International Advances in Economic Research, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 6(4), pages 672-685, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:iaecre:v:6:y:2000:i:4:p:672-685:10.1007/bf02295377
    DOI: 10.1007/BF02295377
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    1. Pompeo Posta & Valeria Bonis, 2009. "Strategic Interactions Among Central Bank and National Fiscal Authorities in a Monetary Union Subject to Asymmetric Country Shocks," Open Economies Review, Springer, vol. 20(2), pages 241-263, April.

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