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A priori szavazási erő az Európai Unió Tanácsában. A demográfiai változások hatása a Tanács döntéshozatalára
[A priori voting power in the Council of the European Union. The impact of demographic shifts on the council s decision-making]

Author

Listed:
  • Petróczy, Dóra Gréta
  • Hatvani, Ákos

Abstract

Tanulmányunkban az Európai Unió Tanácsának minősített többségi szavazási rendszerében megfigyelhető a priori hatalmi befolyást vizsgáljuk a demográfiai változások összefüggésében. Kutatási kérdésünk, hogy az előre jelzett népességadatok alapján változik-e az egyes országok közötti hatalmi erőviszonyok megoszlása az Európai Unió Tanácsában, ha a tagországok és a szervezet döntéshozó mechanizmusai változatlanok maradnak, illetve ha a döntéshozást meghatározó kvóta Costa és szerzőtársai [2023] javaslata szerint módosul. Az a priori szavazati erő mérésére a Banzhaf- és a Shapley-Shubik-indexet használtuk. Megállapítható, hogy a demográfiai trendek okozta befolyásváltozás a déli és keleti országoktól, főleg az Unió balkáni országaiból és Lengyelországból szívja el a befolyást az északi és nyugati, legmarkánsabban a skandináv országok javára. Costa és szerzőtársai [2023] javaslata a Shapley-Shubik-index alapján a legnagyobb öt, a Banzhaf-index alapján a legnagyobb hét tagállam a priori szavazati erejét csorbítaná.

Suggested Citation

  • Petróczy, Dóra Gréta & Hatvani, Ákos, 2025. "A priori szavazási erő az Európai Unió Tanácsában. A demográfiai változások hatása a Tanács döntéshozatalára [A priori voting power in the Council of the European Union. The impact of demographic s," Közgazdasági Szemle (Economic Review - monthly of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), Közgazdasági Szemle Alapítvány (Economic Review Foundation), vol. 0(2), pages 158-177.
    • Handle: RePEc:ksa:szemle:2233
    DOI: 10.18414/KSZ.2025.2.158
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

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