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Eco-Technology Licensing under Emission Tax: Royalty vs. Fixed-Fee

Author

Listed:
  • Seung-Leul Kim

    (Chonnam National University)

  • Sang-Ho Lee

    (Chonnam National University)

Abstract

This article considers the licensing strategies of eco-technology when an innovator provides pollution abatement goods to oligopolistic polluting firms that produce consumption goods and emit environmental pollutants. In the presence of emission tax, two types of licensing contracts, royalty and fixed-fee, are examined to analyze market equilibrium and to compare their welfare consequences. We show that an eco-innovator provides a non-exclusive license under a royalty contract while it might exclude polluting firms under the fixed-fee licensing contract. However, when mixed licensing contract where royalty and fixed-fee contracts are combined together is available, we show that ecoinnovator provides non-exclusive license. We also show that, compared to royalty licensing, exclusive fixed-fee contract will increase the welfare but its welfare effect depends on the level of emission tax. Finally, we derive the optimal emission tax and show that an appropriate emission tax combined with non-exclusion policy or profit-cap regulation can increase the welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Seung-Leul Kim & Sang-Ho Lee, 2014. "Eco-Technology Licensing under Emission Tax: Royalty vs. Fixed-Fee," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 30, pages 273-300.
  • Handle: RePEc:kea:keappr:ker-20141231-30-2-04
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Dongdong Li, 2021. "Optimal licensing strategy of green technology in a mixed oligopoly: Fixed fee versus royalty," Managerial and Decision Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 42(4), pages 942-951, June.
    2. Woohyung Lee & Tohru Naito & Ki-Dong Lee, 2017. "Effects of Mixed Oligopoly and Emission Taxes on the Market and Environment," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 33, pages 267-294.
    3. Kim, Seung-Leul & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2016. "Environmental policy on the fixed-fee licensing of eco-technology under foreign penetration," MPRA Paper 84412, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    4. Kim, Seung-Leul & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2016. "The licensing of eco-technology under emission taxation: Fixed fee vs. auction," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 45(C), pages 343-357.
    5. Chen, Hung-Yi & Yang, Ya-Po & Hu, Jin-Li, 2023. "Environmental taxes under mixed duopoly: The roles of privatization and foreign eco-technology," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
    6. Ismail Saglam, 2023. "Licensing cost‐reducing innovations under supply function competition," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 75(1), pages 180-201, January.
    7. Arturo García & Mariel Leal & Sang-Ho Lee, 2019. "Endogenous Timing with a Socially Responsible Firm," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 35, pages 345-370.
    8. Yan, Yan & Li, Yi, 2023. "Regulation, external R&D, and strategic diffusion of pollution abatement technology," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 731-744.
    9. Kim, Seung-Leul & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2021. "Optimal tariffs with emissions taxes under non-restrictive two-part licensing strategies by a foreign eco-competitor," MPRA Paper 108496, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    10. Sungwan Hong & Seung-Gyu Sim, 2018. "Inelastic Supply of Fossil Energy and Competing Environmental Regulatory Policies," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 10(2), pages 1-17, January.
    11. Cho, Sumi & Kim, Doori & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2022. "Free licensing strategy and ex-post privatization policy with passive ownership," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 106(C).
    12. Jinshi Cheng & Bengang Gong & Bangyi Li, 2018. "Cooperation strategy of technology licensing based on evolutionary game," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 268(1), pages 387-404, September.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Eco-Technology; Fixed-Fee Licensing; Royalty Licensing; Emission Tax;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • Q55 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Technological Innovation
    • Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy

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