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Environmental policy on the fixed-fee licensing of eco-technology under foreign penetration

Author

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  • Kim, Seung-Leul
  • Lee, Sang-Ho

Abstract

This study investigates environmental policy on the fixed-fee licensing strategy of clean eco-technology by an innovator having foreign ownership. We show that near-zero emission taxes accompanied by non-exclusive licensing regulation can improve social welfare when the cost gap is small or foreign penetration is high. However, when foreign ownership is not high, exclusive licensing regulations with an appropriate emission tax policy may improve social welfare.

Suggested Citation

  • Kim, Seung-Leul & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2016. "Environmental policy on the fixed-fee licensing of eco-technology under foreign penetration," MPRA Paper 84412, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    • Handle: RePEc:pra:mprapa:84412
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    File URL: https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/84412/1/MPRA_paper_84412.pdf
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Stamatopoulos, Giorgos & Tauman, Tami, 2009. "On the superiority of fixed fee over auction in asymmetric markets," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 67(1), pages 331-333, September.
    2. Kabiraj, Tarun & Marjit, Sugata, 2003. "Protecting consumers through protection: The role of tariff-induced technology transfer," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 47(1), pages 113-124, February.
    3. Seung-Leul Kim & Sang-Ho Lee, 2014. "Eco-Technology Licensing under Emission Tax: Royalty vs. Fixed-Fee," Korean Economic Review, Korean Economic Association, vol. 30, pages 273-300.
    4. Morton I. Kamien & Yair Tauman, 1986. "Fees Versus Royalties and the Private Value of a Patent," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 101(3), pages 471-491.
    5. Arijit Mukherjee & Yingyi Tsai, 2013. "Technology licensing under optimal tax policy," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 108(3), pages 231-247, April.
    6. Chun-Hui Miao, 2013. "On The Superiority Of Fixed Fee Over Auction In Technology Licensing," Manchester School, University of Manchester, vol. 81(3), pages 324-331, June.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Yan, Yan & Li, Yi, 2023. "Regulation, external R&D, and strategic diffusion of pollution abatement technology," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 86(C), pages 731-744.
    2. Kim, Seung-Leul & Lee, Sang-Ho, 2021. "Optimal tariffs with emissions taxes under non-restrictive two-part licensing strategies by a foreign eco-competitor," MPRA Paper 108496, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Environmental policy; fixed-fee licensing; eco-technology; foreign penetration;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
    • L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy

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