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Preferences: neither behavioural nor mental

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  • Guala, Francesco

Abstract

Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to be interpreted either as behavioural regularities or as mental states. In this paper I challenge this dichotomy and argue that neither interpretation is consistent with scientific practice in choice theory and behavioural economics. Preferences are belief-dependent dispositions with a multiply realizable causal basis, which explains why economists are reluctant to make a commitment about their interpretation.

Suggested Citation

  • Guala, Francesco, 2019. "Preferences: neither behavioural nor mental," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 35(3), pages 383-401, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:35:y:2019:i:03:p:383-401_00
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    Cited by:

    1. Moscati, Ivan, 2021. "On the recent philosophy of decision theory," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115039, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    2. Travis J. Lybbert & Steven T. Buccola, 2021. "The evolving ethics of analysis, publication, and transparency in applied economics," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(4), pages 1330-1351, December.
    3. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2020. "Welfare Economics in Large Worlds: Welfare and Public Policies in an Uncertain Environment," GREDEG Working Papers 2020-08, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    4. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2023. "The Homer economicus narrative: from cognitive psychology to individual public policies," Journal of Economic Methodology, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 30(2), pages 176-187, April.
    5. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2021. "Reconciling Normative and Behavioural Economics: The Problem that Cannot be Solved," GREDEG Working Papers 2021-27, Groupe de REcherche en Droit, Economie, Gestion (GREDEG CNRS), Université Côte d'Azur, France.
    6. Fumagalli, Roberto, 2021. "Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112446, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    7. Roberto Fumagalli, 2021. "Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(3), pages 337-356, October.
    8. Guilhem Lecouteux, 2022. "The Homer economicus narrative: from cognitive psychology to individual public policies," Working Papers hal-03791951, HAL.

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