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The Futile Search For True Utility

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  • Fumagalli, Roberto

Abstract

In traditional decision theory, utility is regarded as a mathematical representation of preferences to be inferred from agents’ choices. In the recent literature at the interface between economics, psychology and neuroscience, several authors argue that economists could develop more predictive and explanatory models by incorporating insights concerning individuals’ hedonic experiences. Some go as far as to contend that utility is literally computed by specific neural areas and urge economists to complement or substitute their notion of utility with some neuro-psychological construct. In this paper, I distinguish three notions of utility that are frequently mentioned in debates about decision theory and examine some critical issues regarding their definition and measurability. Moreover, I provide various empirical and conceptual reasons to doubt that economists should base decision theoretic analyses on some neuro-psychological notion of utility.

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  • Fumagalli, Roberto, 2013. "The Futile Search For True Utility," Economics and Philosophy, Cambridge University Press, vol. 29(3), pages 325-347, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:cup:ecnphi:v:29:y:2013:i:03:p:325-347_00
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Miller, Anne, 2024. "The Concept of Separate needs in Cardinal Utility Theory: A Functional Form for Added Leaning-S-shaped Utlities," MPRA Paper 121455, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Shiri Cohen Kaminitz, 2018. "Happiness Studies and the Problem of Interpersonal Comparisons of Satisfaction: Two Histories, Three Approaches," Journal of Happiness Studies, Springer, vol. 19(2), pages 423-442, February.
    3. Moscati, Ivan, 2021. "On the recent philosophy of decision theory," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 115039, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    4. Roberto Fumagalli, 2016. "Decision sciences and the new case for paternalism: three welfare-related justificatory challenges," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 47(2), pages 459-480, August.
    5. Francesco GUALA, 2017. "Preferences: Neither Behavioural nor Mental," Departmental Working Papers 2017-05, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    6. Travis J. Lybbert & Steven T. Buccola, 2021. "The evolving ethics of analysis, publication, and transparency in applied economics," Applied Economic Perspectives and Policy, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 43(4), pages 1330-1351, December.
    7. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2015. "Behavioral political economy: A survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 40(PB), pages 395-417.
    8. Brendan Markey-Towler, 2016. "Economics cannot isolate itself from political theory: a mathematical demonstration," Papers 1701.06410, arXiv.org.
    9. Fumagalli, Roberto, 2021. "Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating," LSE Research Online Documents on Economics 112446, London School of Economics and Political Science, LSE Library.
    10. Schnellenbach, Jan & Schubert, Christian, 2014. "Behavioral public choice: A survey," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 14/03, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    11. Tomi Rajala, 2019. "Mind the Information Expectation Gap," Journal of the Knowledge Economy, Springer;Portland International Center for Management of Engineering and Technology (PICMET), vol. 10(1), pages 104-125, March.
    12. Roberto Fumagalli, 2021. "Rationality, preference satisfaction and anomalous intentions: why rational choice theory is not self-defeating," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(3), pages 337-356, October.

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