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NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies

Author

Listed:
  • Zhe Yang

    (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
    Ministry of Education)

  • Haiqun Zhang

    (Shanghai University of Finance and Economics
    Ministry of Education)

Abstract

Inspired by Scarf (J Econ Theory 3: 169–181, 1971), Zhao (Int J Game Theory 28: 25–34, 1999), Sandholm (Population games and evolutionary dynamics. MIT Press, Cambridge, 2010) and Yang and Zhang (Optim Lett. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11590-018-1303-5 , 2018), we introduce the model of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies, and define the notions of NTU core and TU core for coalitional population games. We next prove the existence results for NTU cores and TU cores. Furthermore, as an extension of the NTU core, we introduce the notion of strong equilibria and prove the existence theorem of strong equilibria.

Suggested Citation

  • Zhe Yang & Haiqun Zhang, 2019. "NTU core, TU core and strong equilibria of coalitional population games with infinitely many pure strategies," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 87(2), pages 155-170, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:87:y:2019:i:2:d:10.1007_s11238-019-09701-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11238-019-09701-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Ken Urai & Hiromi Murakami & Weiye Chen, 2023. "Generalization of the social coalitional equilibrium structure," Economic Theory Bulletin, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 11(1), pages 1-25, April.

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