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Ukraine Crisis 2014: A Study of Russian-Western Strategic Interaction

Author

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  • Ericson Richard E.

    (Department of Economics, East Carolina University, Brewster A-434, Mail Stop 580, Greenville, NC 27858, USA)

  • Zeager Lester A.

    (Department of Economics, East Carolina University, Brewster A-434, Mail Stop 580, Greenville, NC 27858, USA)

Abstract

This paper presents an analysis of the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 through the lens of the Theory of Moves as formalized by [Willson, S.J., (1998), Long-term Behavior in the Theory of Moves, Theory and Decision, vol. 45, no. 3, pp. 201–240]. It derives the equilibrium (ultimate outcome) states under various assumptions about Western and Russian preferences over outcomes. The “paths” of their generation, i.e., the sequences of strategic choices made by each side, are also explored, casting light on the structure of incentives guiding behavior in the conflict, and perhaps predicting what the actual outcome will be when the world moves beyond this crisis. Incomplete information on preferences prevents derivation of a unique prediction of the outcome of the crisis, but the analysis enables us to substantially narrow the range of possibilities.

Suggested Citation

  • Ericson Richard E. & Zeager Lester A., 2015. "Ukraine Crisis 2014: A Study of Russian-Western Strategic Interaction," Peace Economics, Peace Science, and Public Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 21(2), pages 153-190, April.
    • Handle: RePEc:bpj:pepspp:v:21:y:2015:i:2:p:153-190:n:5
    DOI: 10.1515/peps-2015-0006
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Stephen Willson, 1998. "Long-Term Behavior in the Theory of Moves," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 45(3), pages 201-240, December.
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    Cited by:

    1. Zbyněk Dubský & Radka Havlová, 2016. "The Role of the OSCE in Deescalation of the War in Ukraine [Role OBSE při pokusu o deeskalaci války na Ukrajině]," Současná Evropa, Prague University of Economics and Business, vol. 2016(2), pages 4-23.

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