IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/theord/v42y1997i2p177-192.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Forward Induction In Games With An Outside Option

Author

Listed:
  • GONZALO OLCINA

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Gonzalo Olcina, 1997. "Forward Induction In Games With An Outside Option," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 177-192, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:42:y:1997:i:2:p:177-192
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1004905131574
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/10.1023/A:1004905131574
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1023/A:1004905131574?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, December.
    2. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August.
    3. Harsanyi John C., 1995. "A New Theory of Equilibrium Selection for Games with Incomplete Information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 318-332, August.
    4. Kandori, Michihiro & Mailath, George J & Rob, Rafael, 1993. "Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(1), pages 29-56, January.
    5. Gonzalo Olcina Vauteren & Amparo Urbano Salvador, 1993. "INTROSPECTION AND EQUILIBRIUM SELECTION IN 2x2 MATRIX GAMES," Working Papers. Serie AD 1993-01, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2002:i:2:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    2. Vicente Calabuig, 1999. "Ineficiencias de las negociaciones entre dos agentes completamente informados: un panorama," Investigaciones Economicas, Fundación SEPI, vol. 23(3), pages 303-329, September.
    3. Gonzalo Olcina Vauteren & Vicente Calabuig Alcantara, 1997. "Forward induction in a wage repeated negotiation," Working Papers. Serie AD 1997-16, Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie).
    4. Concepción Peñarrubia & Gonzalo Olcina, 2002. "Specific investments and coordination failures," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 3(2), pages 1-7.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Sven Fischer & Werner Güth & Wieland Müller & Andreas Stiehler, 2006. "From ultimatum to Nash bargaining: Theory and experimental evidence," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 9(1), pages 17-33, April.
    2. van Damme, E.E.C., 1995. "Equilibrium selection in team games," Other publications TiSEM 8651663f-c7e1-4141-8445-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    3. Walter Elberfeld, 1997. "Incentive monotonicity and equilibrium selection in 2×2 matrix games," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 65(3), pages 279-290, October.
    4. Blume, Andreas, 1998. "Communication, Risk, and Efficiency in Games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 22(2), pages 171-202, February.
    5. Battalio,R. & Samuelson,L. & Huyck,J. van, 1998. "Risk dominance, payoff dominance and probabilistic choice learning," Working papers 2, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
    6. Cabrales, Antonio & Garcia-Fontes, Walter & Motta, Massimo, 2000. "Risk dominance selects the leader: An experimental analysis," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 137-162, January.
    7. David Sally, 2002. "`What an Ugly Baby!'," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(1), pages 78-108, February.
    8. Matthias Blonski & Giancarlo Spagnolo, 2015. "Prisoners’ other Dilemma," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 61-81, February.
    9. Rui SILVA, 2018. "Equilibrium Selection in n-Person Static Games with Complete Information," Departmental Working Papers 2018-04, Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano.
    10. Raul V. Fabella & Vigile Marie B. Fabella, 2012. "The Robust Nash Equilibrium and Equilibrium Selection in 2x2 Coordination Games," UP School of Economics Discussion Papers 201216, University of the Philippines School of Economics.
    11. Feige, Christian, 2015. "Success rates in simplified threshold public goods games: A theoretical model," Working Paper Series in Economics 70, Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT), Department of Economics and Management.
    12. Mielke, Jahel & Steudle, Gesine A., 2018. "Green Investment and Coordination Failure: An Investors' Perspective," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 150(C), pages 88-95.
    13. repec:ebl:ecbull:v:3:y:2002:i:2:p:1-7 is not listed on IDEAS
    14. Ganesh S. Birajdar & Balaraju Battu & Krishnavtar Jaiswal & V. S. Chandrasekhar Pammi, 2016. "Modelling Social Dilemmas: A Regret-driven Neural Network Model," Studies in Microeconomics, , vol. 4(2), pages 115-126, December.
    15. Goeree, Jacob K. & Holt, Charles A., 2005. "An experimental study of costly coordination," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(2), pages 349-364, May.
    16. Pilwon Kim & Dongryul Lee, 2019. "Repeated minimum-effort coordination games," Journal of Evolutionary Economics, Springer, vol. 29(4), pages 1343-1359, September.
    17. Maarten C.W. Janssen, 1997. "Focal Points," Tinbergen Institute Discussion Papers 97-091/1, Tinbergen Institute.
    18. Michael Kosfeld, 2002. "Stochastic strategy adjustment in coordination games," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 20(2), pages 321-339.
    19. Sanjeev Goyal & Fernando Vega-Redondo, 2000. "Learning, Network Formation and Coordination," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 0113, Econometric Society.
    20. Ennis, Huberto M. & Keister, Todd, 2005. "Government policy and the probability of coordination failures," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 49(4), pages 939-973, May.
    21. Dieter Balkenborg & Rosemarie Nagel, 2016. "An Experiment on Forward vs. Backward Induction: How Fairness and Level k Reasoning Matter," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(3), pages 378-408, August.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:theord:v:42:y:1997:i:2:p:177-192. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.