Mixed Equilibrium: When Burning Money is Rational
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More about this item
Keywords
Mixed Nash Equilibrium; Burning Money; Collaborative Dominance; Security Dilemma;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- C7 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory
NEP fields
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:- NEP-EXP-2013-01-12 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-01-12 (Game Theory)
- NEP-HPE-2013-01-12 (History and Philosophy of Economics)
- NEP-MIC-2013-01-12 (Microeconomics)
- NEP-UPT-2013-01-12 (Utility Models and Prospect Theory)
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