IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/eee/jeborg/v34y1998i2p279-294.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Indenturing banknotes as a mechanism to induce cooperation in conflict games

Author

Listed:
  • Kritikos, Alexander S.
  • Bolle, Friedel

Abstract

No abstract is available for this item.

Suggested Citation

  • Kritikos, Alexander S. & Bolle, Friedel, 1998. "Indenturing banknotes as a mechanism to induce cooperation in conflict games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 34(2), pages 279-294, February.
    • Handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:34:y:1998:i:2:p:279-294
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0167-2681(97)00056-5
    Download Restriction: Full text for ScienceDirect subscribers only
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John C. Harsanyi & Reinhard Selten, 1988. "A General Theory of Equilibrium Selection in Games," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262582384, April.
    2. Mailath, George J & Samuelson, Larry & Swinkels, Jeroen M, 1993. "Extensive Form Reasoning in Normal Form Games," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 61(2), pages 273-302, March.
    3. Werner, Raub & Keren, Gideon, 1993. "Hostages as a commitment device : A game-theoretic model and an empirical test of some scenarios," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 43-67, May.
    4. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August.
    5. Kohlberg, Elon & Mertens, Jean-Francois, 1986. "On the Strategic Stability of Equilibria," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(5), pages 1003-1037, September.
    6. Drew Fudenberg & Jean Tirole, 1991. "Game Theory," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262061414, April.
    7. van Damme, Eric, 1989. "Stable equilibria and forward induction," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 476-496, August.
    8. Selten, Reinhard, 1994. "Descriptive Approaches to Cooperation," Discussion Paper Serie B 292, University of Bonn, Germany.
    9. Rabin, Matthew, 1993. "Incorporating Fairness into Game Theory and Economics," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 83(5), pages 1281-1302, December.
    10. Gary S. Becker, 1962. "Investment in Human Capital: A Theoretical Analysis," NBER Chapters, in: Investment in Human Beings, pages 9-49, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    11. Williamson, Oliver E, 1983. "Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 519-540, September.
    12. Bull, Clive, 1983. "Implicit Contracts in the Absence of Enforcement and Risk Aversion," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 73(4), pages 658-671, September.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Alexander S. Kritikos & Jonathan H. W. Tan, 2009. "Indenture as a Self‐Enforced Contract Device: An Experimental Test," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 75(3), pages 857-872, January.
    2. Holt, Gerhard, 2000. "A comment on indentured servitude: in response to Kritikos and Bolle -- February 15th, 1998," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 135-136, May.
    3. Kritikos, Alexander S., 2000. "Indenture: an institution for a credible commitment without extortion," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 397-403, November.
    4. Kritikos, Alexander S. & Tan, Jonathan H. W., 2005. "Indenture as a Commitment Device in Self-Enforced Contracts: An Experimental Test," Discussion Papers 241, European University Viadrina Frankfurt (Oder), Department of Business Administration and Economics.
    5. Holt, Gerhard, 2000. "Rejoinder to Kritikos and Bolle: making indenture viable -- the extortionary power of pre-commitment in iterated prisoner's dilemma," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 393-395, November.
    6. Kritikos, Alexander S. & Bolle, Friedel, 2000. "Indenture: a viable contract for a sequential one-shot Prisoners' Dilemma: A reply to Holt," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 42(1), pages 137-139, May.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. David Sally, 2002. "`What an Ugly Baby!'," Rationality and Society, , vol. 14(1), pages 78-108, February.
    2. Thomas Gautschi, 2000. "History Effects In Social Dilemma Situations," Rationality and Society, , vol. 12(2), pages 131-162, May.
    3. Dieter Balkenborg & Rosemarie Nagel, 2016. "An Experiment on Forward vs. Backward Induction: How Fairness and Level k Reasoning Matter," German Economic Review, Verein für Socialpolitik, vol. 17(3), pages 378-408, August.
    4. Asheim, G.B. & Dufwenberg, M., 1996. "Admissibility and Common Knowledge," Discussion Paper 1996-16, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Hauk, Esther & Hurkens, Sjaak, 2002. "On Forward Induction and Evolutionary and Strategic Stability," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 106(1), pages 66-90, September.
    6. GRIGIS DE STEFANO, Federico, 2014. "Strategic stability of equilibria: the missing paragraph," LIDAM Discussion Papers CORE 2014015, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    7. Quazi Shahriar, 2011. "The Power of an Outside Option that Generates a Focal Point: An Experimental Investigation," Economics Bulletin, AccessEcon, vol. 31(3), pages 2151-2158.
    8. Dufwenberg, Martin & Köhlin, Gunnar & Martinsson, Peter & Medhin, Haileselassie, 2016. "Thanks but no thanks: A new policy to reduce land conflict," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 77(C), pages 31-50.
    9. Huck, Steffen & Muller, Wieland, 2005. "Burning money and (pseudo) first-mover advantages: an experimental study on forward induction," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 51(1), pages 109-127, April.
    10. Dieter Balkenborg & Josef Hofbauer & Christoph Kuzmics, 2015. "The refined best-response correspondence in normal form games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 44(1), pages 165-193, February.
    11. Sally, David, 2001. "On sympathy and games," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 44(1), pages 1-30, January.
    12. van Damme, E.E.C., 2000. "Non-cooperative Games," Other publications TiSEM 51465233-a356-4d20-acc4-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    13. Sabrina Teyssier, 2007. "Optimal Group Incentives with Social Preferences and Self-Selection," Post-Print halshs-00144901, HAL.
    14. van Damme, E.E.C., 2015. "Game theory : Noncooperative games," Other publications TiSEM ff518f2b-501f-4d99-817b-c, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    15. Harsanyi, John C., 1995. "A new theory of equilibrium selection for games with complete information," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 91-122.
    16. Ken Binmore & Larry Samuelson, "undated". "Evolutionary Drift and Equilibrium Selection," ELSE working papers 011, ESRC Centre on Economics Learning and Social Evolution.
    17. Heifetz, Aviad & Meier, Martin & Schipper, Burkhard C., 2013. "Dynamic unawareness and rationalizable behavior," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 81(C), pages 50-68.
    18. Govindan, Srihari & Wilson, Robert B., 2005. "Refinements of Nash Equilibrium," Research Papers 1897, Stanford University, Graduate School of Business.
    19. Janssen, Maarten C.W., 2006. "Auctions as coordination devices," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 517-532, April.
    20. Andreas Blume & Peter H. Kriss & Roberto A. Weber, 2017. "Pre-play communication with forgone costly messages: experimental evidence on forward induction," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 20(2), pages 368-395, June.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:eee:jeborg:v:34:y:1998:i:2:p:279-294. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Catherine Liu (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/jebo .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.