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Economics at the FCC 2021–22: 5G Spectrum Auctions, Affordable Connectivity, Broadband Data Collection, and Merger Review

Author

Listed:
  • Joanna Fister

    (Federal Communications Commission)

  • Catherine Matraves

    (Federal Communications Commission
    Federal Communications Commission)

  • Martha Stancill

    (Federal Communications Commission)

  • Donald Stockdale

    (Federal Communications Commission)

  • Sean Sullivan

    (Federal Communications Commission)

  • Shane Taylor

    (Federal Communications Commission)

  • Aleksandr Yankelevich

    (Federal Communications Commission)

Abstract

The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) is responsible for regulation in the communications marketplace and for management of the nation’s non-federal radio spectrum. During the past year, FCC economists continued to work on auctions so as to repurpose mid-band spectrum for advanced wireless services – including 5G – as well as initiatives to close the connectivity gap and make broadband more affordable. FCC economists also evaluated the likely competitive effects of Verizon’s proposed acquisition of prepaid competitor TracFone Wireless. Finally, FCC economists helped in setting up the novel Broadband Data Collection.

Suggested Citation

  • Joanna Fister & Catherine Matraves & Martha Stancill & Donald Stockdale & Sean Sullivan & Shane Taylor & Aleksandr Yankelevich, 2022. "Economics at the FCC 2021–22: 5G Spectrum Auctions, Affordable Connectivity, Broadband Data Collection, and Merger Review," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 61(4), pages 489-520, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:61:y:2022:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-022-09887-6
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-022-09887-6
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nathan H. Miller & Gloria Sheu, 2021. "Quantitative Methods for Evaluating the Unilateral Effects of Mergers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(1), pages 143-177, February.
    2. Farrell Joseph & Shapiro Carl, 2010. "Antitrust Evaluation of Horizontal Mergers: An Economic Alternative to Market Definition," The B.E. Journal of Theoretical Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 10(1), pages 1-41, March.
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew Collins & Stacy Jordan & Wayne Leighton & Kim Makuch & Catherine Matraves & Daniel Shiman & Martha Stancill & Sean Sullivan & Patrick Sun, 2023. "Economics at the FCC 2022–2023: Satellite Marketplace, Broadband Data Collection, Drive Testing, the 988 Suicide & Crisis Lifeline, and Broadcast Station Ownership," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 63(4), pages 467-499, December.
    2. Rabbani, Maysam, 2023. "Mergers with future rivals can boost prices, bar entry, and intensify market concentration," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 88(C).

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