Optimal licensing of technology in the face of (asymmetric) competition
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DOI: 10.1016/j.ijindorg.2018.07.009
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- Cuihong Fan & Byoung Heon Jun & Elmar G. Wolfstetter, 2017. "Optimal Licensing of Technology in the Face of (Asymmetric) Competition," Discussion Paper Series 1705, Institute of Economic Research, Korea University.
References listed on IDEAS
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Citations
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Cited by:
- Hao Xu & Deqing Tan, 2023. "Optimal Abatement Technology Licensing in a Dynamic Transboundary Pollution Game: Fixed Fee Versus Royalty," Computational Economics, Springer;Society for Computational Economics, vol. 61(3), pages 905-935, March.
- Banerjee, Swapnendu & Poddar, Sougata, 2019.
"‘To sell or not to sell’: Licensing versus selling by an outside innovator,"
Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 76(C), pages 293-304.
- Banerjee, Swapnendu & Poddar, Sougata, 2017. "‘To sell or not to sell’: Licensing versus Selling by an outside innovator," MPRA Paper 80432, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Yang, Le & Huang, Zining, 2023. "Quality-improving licensing of an outside innovator in a mixed Cournot duopoly," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 126(C).
- Wu, Cheng-Han, 2019. "Licensing to a competitor and strategic royalty choice in a dynamic duopoly," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 279(3), pages 840-853.
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More about this item
Keywords
Patent licensing; Dynamic mechanisms; Menu auctions;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- D21 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations - - - Firm Behavior: Theory
- D43 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Oligopoly and Other Forms of Market Imperfection
- D44 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Auctions
- D45 - Microeconomics - - Market Structure, Pricing, and Design - - - Rationing; Licensing
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