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The Economics of Tacit Collusion:Implications for Merger Control

In: The Political Economy of Antitrust

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  • Marc Ivaldi
  • Bruno Jullien
  • Patrick Rey
  • Paul Seabright
  • Jean Tirole

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  • Marc Ivaldi & Bruno Jullien & Patrick Rey & Paul Seabright & Jean Tirole, 2007. "The Economics of Tacit Collusion:Implications for Merger Control," Contributions to Economic Analysis, in: The Political Economy of Antitrust, pages 217-239, Emerald Group Publishing Limited.
    • Handle: RePEc:eme:ceazzz:s0573-8555(06)82008-0
    DOI: 10.1016/S0573-8555(06)82008-0
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    Cited by:

    1. Matthew Weinberg & Gloria Sheu & Nathan Miller, 2019. "Oligopolistic Price Leadership and Mergers: An Empirical Model of the U.S. Beer Industry," 2019 Meeting Papers 1210, Society for Economic Dynamics.
    2. Hellwig, Michael & Hüschelrath, Kai, 2018. "When Do Firms Leave Cartels? Determinants And The Impact On Cartel Survival," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 54(C), pages 68-84.
    3. Domenico Buccella & Luciano Fanti, 2022. "Downstream competition and profits under different input price bargaining structures," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 136(3), pages 251-268, August.
    4. Domenico Buccella & Leonard F. S. Wang, 2021. "Union negotiations, product market cooperation, and profits," Metroeconomica, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 72(1), pages 82-100, February.
    5. Savorelli, Luca, 2012. "Asymmetric cross-price effects and collusion," Research in Economics, Elsevier, vol. 66(4), pages 375-382.
    6. Gerlach, Heiko & Nguyen, Lan, 2021. "Price staggering in cartels," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 77(C).
    7. Daniel Monte & Ideen Riahi & Nikolaus Robalino, 2019. "Collusion and turnover in experience goods markets," Review of Economic Design, Springer;Society for Economic Design, vol. 23(3), pages 91-111, December.
    8. Guillem Roig, 2021. "Collusive equilibria with switching costs: The effect of consumer concentration," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 30(1), pages 100-121, February.
    9. João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho, 2018. "Collusion in mixed oligopolies and the coordinated effects of privatization," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 124(1), pages 19-55, May.
    10. Simon Loertscher & Leslie M. Marx, 2021. "Coordinated Effects in Merger Review," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 64(4), pages 705-744.
    11. Garcia Pires, Armando J. & Skjeret, Frode, 2023. "Screening for partial collusion in retail electricity markets," Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 117(C).
    12. Flores-Fillol, Ricardo & Ibañez-Zarate, Guiomar & Theilen, Bernd, 2014. "Domestic and international research joint ventures: The effect of collusion," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 122(1), pages 79-83.
    13. João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2016. "Sustaining collusion in markets with entry driven by balanced growth," Journal of Economics, Springer, vol. 118(1), pages 1-34, May.
    14. Kerkemezos, Yannis & Pennings, Enrico & Karreman, Bas & van Reeven, Peran, 2023. "Price asymmetries and the path dependence of market power: Evidence from the U.S. airline industry," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 87(C).
    15. João Correia-da-Silva & Joana Pinho & Hélder Vasconcelos, 2014. "Sustaining collusion in markets with a general evolution of demand," FEP Working Papers 537, Universidade do Porto, Faculdade de Economia do Porto.
    16. Nathan H. Miller & Gloria Sheu, 2021. "Quantitative Methods for Evaluating the Unilateral Effects of Mergers," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 58(1), pages 143-177, February.
    17. Nobuyuki Hanaki & Aidas Masiliunas, 2021. "Market Concentration and Incentives to Collude in Cournot Oligopoly Experiments," ISER Discussion Paper 1131, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    18. Brown, David P. & Eckert, Andrew & Silveira, Douglas, 2023. "Screening for collusion in wholesale electricity markets: A literature review," Utilities Policy, Elsevier, vol. 85(C).

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