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Economics at the Antitrust Division: 2017–2018

Author

Listed:
  • Luke M. Froeb

    (Vanderbilt University)

  • Russell W. Pittman

    (U.S. Department of Justice)

  • Charles S. Taragin

    (U.S. Department of Justice)

  • Steven Tschantz

    (Vanderbilt University)

  • Gregory J. Werden

    (U.S. Department of Justice)

Abstract

This article describes some of the work of Antitrust Division economists over the past year, with a focus on modeling. It begins by illustrating the mapping from evidence to prediction using tools for assessing the effects of mergers using Bertrand, Cournot, and auction models. It then turns to two hot topics in competition policy: the implications of claims of increasing margins for merger enforcement and the validity of claims of increasing concentration. Finally, it considers how mergers affect prices in bargaining models.

Suggested Citation

  • Luke M. Froeb & Russell W. Pittman & Charles S. Taragin & Steven Tschantz & Gregory J. Werden, 2018. "Economics at the Antitrust Division: 2017–2018," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 53(4), pages 637-651, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:53:y:2018:i:4:d:10.1007_s11151-018-9663-7
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-018-9663-7
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alexandrov, Alexei & Pittman, Russell & Ukhaneva, Olga, 2018. "Pricing of Complements in the U.S. freight railroads: Cournot versus Coase," MPRA Paper 86279, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Jerry Hausman & Gregory Leonard & J. Douglas Zona, 1994. "Competitive Analysis with Differentiated Products," Annals of Economics and Statistics, GENES, issue 34, pages 143-157.
    3. repec:adr:anecst:y:1994:i:34:p:06 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    5. Miller, Nathan H., 2014. "Modeling the effects of mergers in procurement," International Journal of Industrial Organization, Elsevier, vol. 37(C), pages 201-208.
    6. Pittman, Russell W. & Werden, Gregory J., 1990. "The divergence of SIC industries from antitrust markets : Indications from Justice Department merger cases," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 33(3), pages 283-286, July.
    7. Werden, Gregory J, 1996. "A Robust Test for Consumer Welfare Enhancing Mergers among Sellers of Differentiated Products," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 44(4), pages 409-413, December.
    8. Froeb, Luke M. & Koyak, Robert A. & Werden, Gregory J., 1993. "What is the effect of bid-rigging on prices?," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 42(4), pages 419-423.
    9. Lars A. Stole & Jeffrey Zwiebel, 1996. "Intra-firm Bargaining under Non-binding Contracts," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 63(3), pages 375-410.
    10. Catherine C. Fontenay & Joshua S. Gans, 2014. "Bilateral Bargaining with Externalities," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 62(4), pages 756-788, December.
    11. Froeb, Luke M. & Werden, Gregory J., 1998. "A robust test for consumer welfare enhancing mergers among sellers of a homogeneous product," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 58(3), pages 367-369, March.
    12. Werden, Gregory J & Froeb, Luke M, 1994. "The Effects of Mergers in Differentiated Products Industries: Logit Demand and Merger Policy," The Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 10(2), pages 407-426, October.
    13. Lance Brannman & Luke M. Froeb, 2000. "Mergers, Cartels, Set-Asides, and Bidding Preferences in Asymmetric Oral Auctions," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 82(2), pages 283-290, May.
    14. Gloria Sheu & Charles Taragin, 2021. "Simulating mergers in a vertical supply chain with bargaining," RAND Journal of Economics, RAND Corporation, vol. 52(3), pages 596-632, September.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust; Bargaining; Concentration; Mergers;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • C78 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Bargaining Theory; Matching Theory
    • K21 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Antitrust Law
    • L40 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - General

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