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China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: What is the Welfare Standard?

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  • Pingping Shan
  • Guofu Tan
  • Simon Wilkie
  • Michael Williams

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Suggested Citation

  • Pingping Shan & Guofu Tan & Simon Wilkie & Michael Williams, 2012. "China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: What is the Welfare Standard?," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(1), pages 31-52, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:41:y:2012:i:1:p:31-52
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-012-9349-5
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Deneckere, Raymond & Marvel, Howard P & Peck, James, 1997. "Demand Uncertainty and Price Maintenance: Markdowns as Destructive Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 87(4), pages 619-641, September.
    2. Motta,Massimo, 2004. "Competition Policy," Cambridge Books, Cambridge University Press, number 9780521016919, September.
    3. Ping Lin & Jingjing Zhao, 2012. "Merger Control Policy Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(1), pages 109-132, August.
    4. Russell Pittman, 2007. "Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement," EAG Discussions Papers 200709, Department of Justice, Antitrust Division.
    5. Russ Pittman, 2007. "Consumer Surplus as the Appropriate Standard for Antitrust Enforcement," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 3.
    6. DePrano, Michael E & Nugent, Jeffrey B, 1969. "Economies as an Antitrust Defense: Comment," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 59(5), pages 947-953, December.
    7. Dennis W. Carlton, 2007. "Does Antitrust Need to be Modernized?," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 21(3), pages 155-176, Summer.
    8. Mandelker, Gershon, 1974. "Risk and return: The case of merging firms," Journal of Financial Economics, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 303-335, December.
    9. Joseph Farrell & Michael Katz, 2006. "The Economics of Welfare Standards in Antitrust," CPI Journal, Competition Policy International, vol. 2.
    10. Xinzhu Zhang & Vanessa Zhang, 2012. "New Wine into Old Wineskins: Recent Developments in China’s Competition Policy Against Monopolistic/Collusive Agreements," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(1), pages 53-75, August.
    11. An Renckens, 2007. "Welfare Standards, Substantive Tests, And Efficiency Considerations In Merger Policy: Defining The Efficiency Defense," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(2), pages 149-179.
    12. Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert W, 1988. "Value Maximization and the Acquisition Process," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 2(1), pages 7-20, Winter.
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    Cited by:

    1. Germán Bet & Roger D. Blair, 2019. "Williamson’s Welfare Trade-Off Around the World," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 55(3), pages 515-533, November.
    2. Ping Lin & Jingjing Zhao, 2012. "Merger Control Policy Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 41(1), pages 109-132, August.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Antitrust; Anti-Monopoly Law; Merger; Welfare standard; L4; L43; L44;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
    • L43 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Legal Monopolies and Regulation or Deregulation
    • L44 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Antitrust Policy and Public Enterprise, Nonprofit Institutions, and Professional Organizations

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