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Efficiency in Second-Price Auctions: A New Look at Old Data

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  • Rodney Garratt
  • John Wooders

Abstract

The experimental economics literature on second-price sealed-bid private value auctions has established that subjects typically bid more than their value, despite the fact that value bidding is a dominant strategy in such auctions. Moreover, the laboratory evidence shows that subjects do not learn to bid their values as they gain more experience. In the present paper, we re-examine the second-price auction data from Kagel and Levin’s (1993) classic paper. We find that auction efficiency is rising over time, even though the frequency of overbidding is unchanged. We argue that the rise in efficiency is due to a decline in the variability of overbidding. This is consistent with subjects learning to bid more like each other.
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  • Rodney Garratt & John Wooders, 2010. "Efficiency in Second-Price Auctions: A New Look at Old Data," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 37(1), pages 43-50, August.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:37:y:2010:i:1:p:43-50
    DOI: 10.1007/s11151-010-9255-7
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    1. Bergstrom, Carl T. & Bergstrom, Ted C & Garratt, Rod, 2009. "Ideal Bootstrapping and Exact Recombination: Applications to Auction Experiments," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt4xb7454q, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    2. Mullin, Charles H. & Reiley, David H., 2006. "Recombinant estimation for normal-form games, with applications to auctions and bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 54(1), pages 159-182, January.
    3. Mitzkewitz, Michael & Nagel, Rosemarie, 1993. "Experimental Results on Ultimatum Games with Incomplete Information," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer;Game Theory Society, vol. 22(2), pages 171-198.
    4. Kagel, John H & Levin, Dan, 1993. "Independent Private Value Auctions: Bidder Behaviour in First-, Second- and Third-Price Auctions with Varying Numbers of Bidders," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 103(419), pages 868-879, July.
    5. Mehta, Judith & Starmer, Chris & Sugden, Robert, 1994. "The Nature of Salience: An Experimental Investigation of Pure Coordination Games," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 84(3), pages 658-673, June.
    6. Rodney Garratt & John Wooders, 2010. "Efficiency in Second-Price Auctions: A New Look at Old Data," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 37(1), pages 43-50, August.
    7. Ronald Harstad, 2000. "Dominant Strategy Adoption and Bidders' Experience with Pricing Rules," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 3(3), pages 261-280, December.
    8. Kagel, John H & Harstad, Ronald M & Levin, Dan, 1987. "Information Impact and Allocation Rules in Auctions with Affiliated Private Values: A Laboratory Study," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 55(6), pages 1275-1304, November.
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    Cited by:

    1. Thomas Giebe & Radosveta Ivanova-Stenzel & Martin G. Kocher & Simeon Schudy, 2024. "Cross-game learning and cognitive ability in auctions," Experimental Economics, Springer;Economic Science Association, vol. 27(1), pages 80-108, March.
    2. Kirchkamp, O. & Reiss, J.P. & Sadrieh, A., 2008. "A pure variation of risk in private-value auctions," Research Memorandum 050, Maastricht University, Maastricht Research School of Economics of Technology and Organization (METEOR).
    3. Olena Myrna, 2022. "Lower price increases, the bounded rationality of bidders, and underbidding concerns in online agricultural land auctions: The Ukrainian case," Journal of Agricultural Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 73(3), pages 826-844, September.
    4. Cong Feng & Scott Fay & K. Sivakumar, 2016. "Overbidding in electronic auctions: factors influencing the propensity to overbid and the magnitude of overbidding," Journal of the Academy of Marketing Science, Springer, vol. 44(2), pages 241-260, March.
    5. Bramsen, Jens-Martin, 2008. "Learning to bid, but not to quit – Experience and Internet auctions," MPRA Paper 14815, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    6. Lorentziadis, Panos L., 2016. "Optimal bidding in auctions from a game theory perspective," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 248(2), pages 347-371.
    7. Rodney Garratt & John Wooders, 2010. "Efficiency in Second-Price Auctions: A New Look at Old Data," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 37(1), pages 43-50, August.

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