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Predatory Pricing and the Speed of Antitrust Enforcement

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  • Andrew Eckert

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  • Andrew Eckert, 2002. "Predatory Pricing and the Speed of Antitrust Enforcement," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 20(4), pages 375-383, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:revind:v:20:y:2002:i:4:p:375-383
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1015697027115
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
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    Cited by:

    1. Gunnar ALEXANDERSSON & Staffan HULTÉN, 2007. "High And Low Bids In Tenders: Strategic Pricing And Other Bidding Behaviour In Public Tenders Of Passenger Railway Services," Annals of Public and Cooperative Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 78(2), pages 161-194, June.
    2. Gunnar Alexandersson & Staffan Hultén, 2006. "Predatory bidding in competitive tenders: A Swedish case study," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(1), pages 73-94, July.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Competition policy; predatory pricing;

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