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Dango: Japan'S Price‐Fixing Conspiracies

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  • John McMillan

Abstract

This paper addresses two questions about collusion in the Japanese construction industry. First, what mechanisms are used for enforcing the collusive agreement, for dividing the spoils, and for preventing the entry of new firms seeking a share of the collusive profits? Second, how much are prices raised as a result of the collusion?

Suggested Citation

  • John McMillan, 1991. "Dango: Japan'S Price‐Fixing Conspiracies," Economics and Politics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 3(3), pages 201-218, November.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:ecopol:v:3:y:1991:i:3:p:201-218
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1468-0343.1991.tb00047.x
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    Cited by:

    1. Susan Athey & Kyle Bagwell, 2008. "Collusion With Persistent Cost Shocks," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 76(3), pages 493-540, May.
    2. Porter, Robert H & Zona, J Douglas, 1993. "Detection of Bid Rigging in Procurement Auctions," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 101(3), pages 518-538, June.
    3. Pavlov, Gregory, 2008. "Maximal loss from collusion in IPV symmetric auctions," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 99(2), pages 345-348, May.
    4. Coppier, Raffaella & Costantini, Mauro & Piga, Gustavo, 2009. "Do "Clean Hands" Ensure Healthy Growth? Theory and Practice in the Battle Against Corruption," Economics Series 238, Institute for Advanced Studies.
    5. Paul Klemperer, 2007. "Bidding Markets," Journal of Competition Law and Economics, Oxford University Press, vol. 3(1), pages 1-47.
    6. Baomin Dong, 2013. "Cost-Based Anti-dumping as a Repeated Game," The Economic Record, The Economic Society of Australia, vol. 89, pages 95-105, June.
    7. Raffaella Coppier & Mauro Costantini & Gustavo Piga, 2013. "The Role Of Monitoring Of Corruption In A Simple Endogenous Growth Model," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 51(4), pages 1972-1985, October.
    8. Rieko Ishii, 2007. "Collusion in Repeated Procurement Auction: a Study of Paving Market in Japan," Discussion Papers in Economics and Business 07-16, Osaka University, Graduate School of Economics.
    9. Olga Gorelkina, 2014. "Bidder Collusion and the Auction with Target Bids," Discussion Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods 2014_10, Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods.
    10. Hiroshi Ohashi, 2009. "Effects of Transparency in Procurement Practices on Government Expenditure: A Case Study of Municipal Public Works," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 34(3), pages 267-285, May.
    11. Srabana Gupta, 2001. "The Effect of Bid Rigging on Prices: A Study of the Highway Construction Industry," Review of Industrial Organization, Springer;The Industrial Organization Society, vol. 19(4), pages 451-465, December.
    12. Nihashi, M. & Saijo, T. & Une, M., 2000. "The Outsider and Sunk Cost Effects on 'Dango' in Public Procurement Bidding: An Experimental Analysis," ISER Discussion Paper 0514, Institute of Social and Economic Research, Osaka University.
    13. Srabana Gupta, 2002. "Competition and collusion in a government procurement auction market," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 30(1), pages 13-25, March.
    14. Alfons Van Marrewijk & Marcel B. Veenswijk, 2016. "Changing institutional practices in the Dutch construction industry," International Journal of Project Organisation and Management, Inderscience Enterprises Ltd, vol. 8(1), pages 44-62.
    15. Natalia Fabra, 2003. "Tacit Collusion in Repeated Auctions: Uniform Versus Discriminatory," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 51(3), pages 271-293, September.
    16. Jan Palguta, 2013. "Nonlinear Incentive Schemes and Corruption in Public Procurement: Evidence from the Czech Republic," CERGE-EI Working Papers wp483, The Center for Economic Research and Graduate Education - Economics Institute, Prague.

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