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Strategic incentives under vertical integration: the case of wireline-affiliated wireless carriers and intermodal competition in the US

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  • Paul Zimmerman

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  • Paul Zimmerman, 2008. "Strategic incentives under vertical integration: the case of wireline-affiliated wireless carriers and intermodal competition in the US," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 282-298, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:regeco:v:34:y:2008:i:3:p:282-298
    DOI: 10.1007/s11149-008-9065-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Baker, Jonathan B & Rubinfeld, Daniel L, 1999. "Empirical Methods in Antitrust Litigation: Review and Critique," American Law and Economics Review, American Law and Economics Association, vol. 1(1-2), pages 386-435, Fall.
    2. repec:bla:jindec:v:48:y:2000:i:3:p:253-86 is not listed on IDEAS
    3. Hausman Jerry A. & Sidak J. Gregory, 2004. "Why Do the Poor and the Less-Educated Pay More for Long-Distance Calls?," The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy, De Gruyter, vol. 3(1), pages 1-27, April.
    4. Rodini, Mark & Ward, Michael R. & Woroch, Glenn A., 0. "Going mobile: substitutability between fixed and mobile access," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 27(5-6), pages 457-476, June.
    5. David Reiffen & Laurence Schumann & Michael R. Ward, 2000. "Discriminatory Dealing with Downstream Competitors: Evidence from the Cellular Industry," Journal of Industrial Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 48(3), pages 253-286, September.
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    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Jeffrey Prince & Shane Greenstein, 2017. "Measuring Consumer Preferences for Video Content Provision via Cord‐Cutting Behavior," Journal of Economics & Management Strategy, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 26(2), pages 293-317, June.
    2. Steffen Hoernig & Marc Bourreau & Carlo Cambini, 2014. "Fixed-mobile integration," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 45(1), pages 57-74, February.
    3. Navío-Marco, Julio & Solórzano-García, Marta & Matilla-García, Mariano & Urueña, Alberto, 2016. "Language as a key factor of long-term value creation in mergers and acquisitions in the telecommunications sector," Telecommunications Policy, Elsevier, vol. 40(10), pages 1052-1063.
    4. Vogelsang Ingo, 2013. "The Endgame of Telecommunications Policy? A Survey," Review of Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 64(3), pages 193-270, December.
    5. Navío-Marco, Julio & Serrano Calle, Silvia & Solórzano-García, Marta, 2017. "Analysis of glamorous acquisitions in the telecommunications sector: Overvaluation or success?," 28th European Regional ITS Conference, Passau 2017 169487, International Telecommunications Society (ITS).
    6. Vogelsang, Ingo, 2010. "The relationship between mobile and fixed-line communications: A survey," Information Economics and Policy, Elsevier, vol. 22(1), pages 4-17, March.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Business cannibalization; Intermodal competition; Telecommunications; Vertical integration; Wireless telephony; K23; L12; L13; L41; L96;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • K23 - Law and Economics - - Regulation and Business Law - - - Regulated Industries and Administrative Law
    • L12 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Monopoly; Monopolization Strategies
    • L13 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Oligopoly and Other Imperfect Markets
    • L41 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies - - - Monopolization; Horizontal Anticompetitive Practices
    • L96 - Industrial Organization - - Industry Studies: Transportation and Utilities - - - Telecommunications

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