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Collusion analysis of the Alabama liquid asphalt market

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  • D. R. Kamerschen
  • J. E. Morgan

Abstract

The Alabama liquid asphalt market in the USA is examined over the period 1961-1978 for evidence of activity consistent with collusion. Some 14 conditional collusion-facilitating factors that could influence a market's tendency towards collusion, not all equally important or necessarily in agreement with every other factor, were considered. While some of these factors are controversial and can help or harm a collusion, the net balance of factors and all of the important factors and evidence pointed towards being consistent with a conspiracy. While not examined as extensively, it was also found that the circumstantial evidence in the market was also consistent with collusion. This article suggests a procedural methodology for initiation and resolution of suspected collusion for determining appropriate damages. While the precise law and damages allowed will be country-specific, the general methodology should have wide application in many countries whose laws attempt to foster and preserve competition and punish and deter monopoly acquired and maintained by acting badly, such as by colluding or exclusionary conduct.

Suggested Citation

  • D. R. Kamerschen & J. E. Morgan, 2004. "Collusion analysis of the Alabama liquid asphalt market," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(7), pages 673-693.
  • Handle: RePEc:taf:applec:v:36:y:2004:i:7:p:673-693
    DOI: 10.1080/0003684042000222061
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. David Kamerschen, 2004. "A mnemonic for the major factors influencing the likelihood of collusion," Applied Economics, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 36(10), pages 1021-1024.
    2. André p. Liebenberg & David R. Kamerschen, 2008. "Structure, Conduct And Performance Analysis Of The South African Auto Insurance Market: 1980‐2000," South African Journal of Economics, Economic Society of South Africa, vol. 76(2), pages 228-238, June.
    3. Bernd-O. Heine & Matthias Meyer & Oliver Strangfeld, 2005. "Stylised Facts and the Contribution of Simulation to the Economic Analysis of Budgeting," Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, Journal of Artificial Societies and Social Simulation, vol. 8(4), pages 1-4.

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