Effectiveness of policy against illegal disposal of waste
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1007/s10018-011-0024-0
Download full text from publisher
As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.
References listed on IDEAS
- Gary S. Becker, 1974.
"Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach,"
NBER Chapters, in: Essays in the Economics of Crime and Punishment, pages 1-54,
National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Gary S. Becker, 1968. "Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 76(2), pages 169-169.
- Shimshack, Jay P. & Ward, Michael B., 2005.
"Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 50(3), pages 519-540, November.
- Shimshack, Jay P. & Ward, Michael B., 2005. "Regulator reputation, enforcement, and environmental compliance," MPRA Paper 25994, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Heyes, Anthony G., 1996. "Cutting environmental penalties to protect the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 60(2), pages 251-265, May.
- Laplante, Benoit & Rilstone, Paul, 1996. "Environmental Inspections and Emissions of the Pulp and Paper Industry in Quebec," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 31(1), pages 19-36, July.
- Kleit, Andrew N & Pierce, Meredith A & Hill, R Carter, 1998. "Environmental Protection, Agency Motivations, and Rent Extraction: The Regulation of Water Pollution in Louisiana," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 13(2), pages 121-137, March.
- Friesen, Lana, 2003.
"Targeting enforcement to improve compliance with environmental regulations,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 46(1), pages 72-85, July.
- Friesen, Lana, 2001. "Targeting Enforcement to Improve Compliance with Environmental Regulations," 2001 Conference (45th), January 23-25, 2001, Adelaide, Australia 125634, Australian Agricultural and Resource Economics Society.
- Raymond, Mark, 1999. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted: a reconsideration under asymmetric information," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 289-295, August.
- Magat, Wesley A & Viscusi, W Kip, 1990. "Effectiveness of the EPA's Regulatory Enforcement: The Case of Industrial Effluent Standards," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 33(2), pages 331-360, October.
- Eric Helland, 1998. "The Enforcement Of Pollution Control Laws: Inspections, Violations, And Self-Reporting," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(1), pages 141-153, February.
- Harrington, Winston, 1988. "Enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 29-53, October.
- Anthony Heyes (ed.), 2001. "The Law and Economics of the Environment," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2037.
- Sarah Stafford, 2007. "Can consumers enforce environmental regulations? The role of the market in hazardous waste compliance," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 31(1), pages 83-107, February.
- Hilary Sigman, 1998. "Midnight Dumping: Public Policies and Illegal Disposal of Used Oil," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 29(1), pages 157-178, Spring.
- Earnhart, Dietrich, 2004. "Regulatory factors shaping environmental performance at publicly-owned treatment plants," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 48(1), pages 655-681, July.
- Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2006.
"An Experimental Study of Compliance and Leverage in Auditing and Regulatory Enforcement,"
Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 44(2), pages 352-366, April.
- Timothy N. Cason & Lata Gangadharan, 2004. "An Experimental Study of Compliance and Leverage in Auditing and Regulatory Enforcement," Department of Economics - Working Papers Series 918, The University of Melbourne.
- Heyes, Anthony & Rickman, Neil, 1999. "Regulatory dealing - revisiting the Harrington paradox," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 72(3), pages 361-378, June.
- Lear, Kelly Kristen & Maxwell, John W, 1998. "The Impact of Industry Structure and Penalty Policies on Incentives for Compliance and Regulatory Enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 127-148, September.
- Leung, Siu Fai, 1991.
"How to make the fine fit the corporate crime? : An analysis of static and dynamic optimal punishment theories,"
Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(2), pages 243-256, July.
- Leung, S.F., 1991. "How to Make the Fine Fit the Corporate Crime? An Analysis of Static and Dynamic Optimal Punishment Theories," RCER Working Papers 261, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
- Harford, Jon D. & Harrington, Winston, 1991. "A reconsideration of enforcement leverage when penalties are restricted," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 45(3), pages 391-395, August.
- Livernois, John & McKenna, C. J., 1999. "Truth or consequences: Enforcing pollution standards with self-reporting," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(3), pages 415-440, March.
- Bose, Pinaki, 1995. "Regulatory errors, optimal fines and the level of compliance," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 56(3), pages 475-484, March.
- Oljaca, Neda & Keeler, Andrew G & Dorfman, Jeffrey, 1998. "Penalty Functions for Environmental Violations: Evidence from Water Quality Enforcement," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 14(3), pages 255-264, November.
- Nadeau, Louis W., 1997. "EPA Effectiveness at Reducing the Duration of Plant-Level Noncompliance," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 54-78, September.
- Stafford, Sarah L., 2002. "The Effect of Punishment on Firm Compliance with Hazardous Waste Regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 290-308, September.
- Surabhi Kadambe & Kathleen Segerson, 1998. "On the Role of Fines as an Environmental Enforcement Tool," Journal of Environmental Planning and Management, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 41(2), pages 217-226.
- Eckert, Heather, 2004. "Inspections, warnings, and compliance: the case of petroleum storage regulation," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 232-259, March.
- Levinson, Arik, 1999. "NIMBY taxes matter: the case of state hazardous waste disposal taxes," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 74(1), pages 31-51, October.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Yuichi Ishimura & Kenji Takeuchi, 2017. "Does conflict matter? Spatial distribution of disposal sites in Japan," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 19(1), pages 99-120, January.
- Shigeru Matsumoto & Takanori Ishii, 2013. "Order of occupancy in the settlement of pollution disputes," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 15(3), pages 329-341, July.
- Hajime Sugeta & Takayoshi Shinkuma, 2012. "International trade in recycled materials in vertically related markets," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(4), pages 357-382, October.
- Daisuke Numata & Shunsuke Managi, 2012. "Demand for refilled reusable products," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(4), pages 421-436, October.
- Makiko Nakano & Shunsuke Managi, 2012. "Waste generations and efficiency measures in Japan," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(4), pages 327-339, October.
- Alessio D’Amato & Shunsuke Managi & Massimiliano Mazzanti, 2012. "Economics of waste management and disposal: decoupling, policy enforcement and spatial factors," Environmental Economics and Policy Studies, Springer;Society for Environmental Economics and Policy Studies - SEEPS, vol. 14(4), pages 323-325, October.
- Wesley Blundell & Gautam Gowrisankaran & Ashley Langer, 2020.
"Escalation of Scrutiny: The Gains from Dynamic Enforcement of Environmental Regulations,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(8), pages 2558-2585, August.
- Wesley Blundell & Gautam Gowrisankaran & Ashley Langer, 2018. "Escalation of Scrutiny: The Gains from Dynamic Enforcement of Environmental Regulations," NBER Working Papers 24810, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Blundell, Wesley, 2020. "When threats become credible: A natural experiment of environmental enforcement from Florida," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 101(C).
Most related items
These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.- Alm, James & Shimshack, Jay, 2014.
"Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from Pollution, Safety, and Tax Settings,"
Foundations and Trends(R) in Microeconomics, now publishers, vol. 10(4), pages 209-274, December.
- James Alm & Jay Shimshack, 2014. "Environmental Enforcement and Compliance: Lessons from Pollution, Safety, and Tax Settings," Working Papers 1409, Tulane University, Department of Economics.
- Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2012.
"Learning about compliance under asymmetric information,"
Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 55-73.
- Carmen Arguedas & Sandra Rousseau, 2008. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Working Papers of Department of Economics, Leuven ces0808, KU Leuven, Faculty of Economics and Business (FEB), Department of Economics, Leuven.
- Arguedas, Carmen & Rousseau, Sandra, 2008. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Working Papers in Economic Theory 2008/02, Universidad Autónoma de Madrid (Spain), Department of Economic Analysis (Economic Theory and Economic History).
- Arguedas Carmen & Rousseau Sandra, 2008. "Learning about compliance under asymmetric information," Energy, Transport and Environment Working Papers Series ete0802, KU Leuven, Department of Economics - Research Group Energy, Transport and Environment.
- Thomas J. Miceli & Kathleen Segerson & Dietrich Earnhart, 2022. "The role of experience in deterring crime: A theory of specific versus general deterrence," Economic Inquiry, Western Economic Association International, vol. 60(4), pages 1833-1853, October.
- Tihitina Andarge & Erik Lichtenberg, 2020. "Regulatory compliance under enforcement gaps," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 57(3), pages 181-202, June.
- Lirong Liu & Zhou Yang, 2020. "Leveraged enforcement under the EPA’s High Priority Violation Policy," Empirical Economics, Springer, vol. 58(3), pages 1279-1304, March.
- Nyborg, Karine & Telle, Kjetil, 2004. "A dissolving paradox: Firms’ compliance to environmental regulation," Memorandum 02/2004, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
- Jay P. Shimshack, 2014. "The Economics of Environmental Monitoring and Enforcement," Annual Review of Resource Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 6(1), pages 339-360, October.
- Rousseau, Sandra, 2009. "Empirical Analysis of Sanctions for Environmental Offenses," International Review of Environmental and Resource Economics, now publishers, vol. 3(3), pages 161-194, December.
- André, Francisco J. & Sokri, Abderrahmane & Zaccour, Georges, 2011.
"Public Disclosure Programs vs. traditional approaches for environmental regulation: Green goodwill and the policies of the firm,"
European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 212(1), pages 199-212, July.
- Francisco J. André & Abderrahmane Sokri & Georges Zaccour, 2009. "Public Disclosure Programs vs. Traditional Approaches for Environmental Regulation: Green Goodwill and the Policies of the Firm," Working Papers 09.02, Universidad Pablo de Olavide, Department of Economics.
- Earnhart, Dietrich & Friesen, Lana, 2021. "Use of competitive endogenous audit mechanisms by federal and state inspectors within environmental protection agencies," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 109(C).
- Sandra Rousseau, 2007. "Timing of environmental inspections: survival of the compliant," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 17-36, August.
- Shimshack, Jay P. & Ward, Michael B., 2022.
"Costly sanctions and the treatment of frequent violators in regulatory settings,"
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 116(C).
- Jay P. Shimshack & Michael B. Ward, 2022. "Costly sanctions and the treatment of frequent violators in regulatory settings," Monash Economics Working Papers 2022-20, Monash University, Department of Economics.
- Germani, Anna Rita & Morone, Andrea & Morone, Piergiuseppe & Scaramozzino, Pasquale, 2013. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between firms, regulatory agency and justice department: a theoretical and empirical investigation," MPRA Paper 51369, University Library of Munich, Germany.
- Anna Rita Germani & Pasquale Scaramozzino & Andrea Morone & Piergiuseppe Morone, 2017. "Discretionary enforcement and strategic interactions between enforcement agencies and firms: a theoretical and laboratory investigation," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 52(3), pages 255-284, December.
- Sarah Stafford, 2013. "How predictable are environmental compliance inspections?," Journal of Regulatory Economics, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 361-388, December.
- Andarge, Tihitina & Lichtenberg, Erik, 2018. "Regulated Firm Strategy under Uncertainty about Regulatory Status," 2018 Annual Meeting, August 5-7, Washington, D.C. 274420, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association.
- Khanna Madhu & Widyawati Diah, 2011. "Fostering Regulatory Compliance: The Role of Environmental Self-Auditing and Audit Policies," Review of Law & Economics, De Gruyter, vol. 7(1), pages 125-160, May.
- Stafford, Sarah L., 2002. "The Effect of Punishment on Firm Compliance with Hazardous Waste Regulations," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 44(2), pages 290-308, September.
- Wesley Blundell & Gautam Gowrisankaran & Ashley Langer, 2020.
"Escalation of Scrutiny: The Gains from Dynamic Enforcement of Environmental Regulations,"
American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 110(8), pages 2558-2585, August.
- Wesley Blundell & Gautam Gowrisankaran & Ashley Langer, 2018. "Escalation of Scrutiny: The Gains from Dynamic Enforcement of Environmental Regulations," NBER Working Papers 24810, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Dietrich Earnhart & Lana Friesen, 2021. "Enforcement Federalism: Comparing the Effectiveness of Federal Punishment versus State Punishment," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 78(2), pages 227-255, February.
More about this item
Keywords
Environmental regulations; Enforcement leverage; Disposers and waste management; Q58; K42; H23;All these keywords.
JEL classification:
- Q58 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics - - - Environmental Economics: Government Policy
- K42 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Illegal Behavior and the Enforcement of Law
- H23 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Externalities; Redistributive Effects; Environmental Taxes and Subsidies
Statistics
Access and download statisticsCorrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:spr:envpol:v:14:y:2012:i:2:p:123-145. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.