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The Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward?

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  • Finus, Michael
  • Tjotta, Sigve

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  • Finus, Michael & Tjotta, Sigve, 2003. "The Oslo Protocol on sulfur reduction: the great leap forward?," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 87(9-10), pages 2031-2048, September.
  • Handle: RePEc:eee:pubeco:v:87:y:2003:i:9-10:p:2031-2048
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    2. de Zeeuw, A J & van der Ploeg, F, 1991. "Difference Games and Policy Evaluation: A Conceptual Framework," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 43(4), pages 612-636, October.
    3. Murdoch, James C. & Sandler, Todd, 1997. "The voluntary provision of a pure public good: The case of reduced CFC emissions and the Montreal Protocol," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(3), pages 331-349, February.
    4. Drew Fudenberg & Eric Maskin, 2008. "The Folk Theorem In Repeated Games With Discounting Or With Incomplete Information," World Scientific Book Chapters, in: Drew Fudenberg & David K Levine (ed.), A Long-Run Collaboration On Long-Run Games, chapter 11, pages 209-230, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd..
    5. Farrell, Joseph & Maskin, Eric, 1989. "Renegotiation in repeated games," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 1(4), pages 327-360, December.
    6. Parkash Chander & Henry Tulkens, 2006. "A Core-Theoretic Solution for the Design of Cooperative Agreements on Transfrontier Pollution," Springer Books, in: Parkash Chander & Jacques Drèze & C. Knox Lovell & Jack Mintz (ed.), Public goods, environmental externalities and fiscal competition, chapter 0, pages 176-193, Springer.
    7. Christoph Böhringer & Michael Finus & Carsten Vogt (ed.), 2002. "Controlling Global Warming," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 2535.
    8. Carraro, Carlo & Siniscalco, Domenico, 1993. "Strategies for the international protection of the environment," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(3), pages 309-328, October.
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    10. Ger Klaassen & Finn Førsund & Markus Amann, 1994. "Emission trading in Europe with an exchange rate," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 4(4), pages 305-330, August.
    11. Mohr, Ernst, 1988. "On the Incredibility of Perfect Threats in Repeated Games: Note," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 29(3), pages 551-555, August.
    12. James C. Murdoch & Todd Sandler, 1997. "Voluntary Cutbacks and Pretreaty Behavior: the Helsinki Protocol and Sulfur Emissions," Public Finance Review, , vol. 25(2), pages 139-162, March.
    13. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    14. Fankhauser, Samuel & Kverndokk, Snorre, 1996. "The global warming game -- Simulations of a CO2-reduction agreement," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 18(1), pages 83-102, March.
    15. Michael Finus & Bianca Rundshagen, 1998. "Renegotiation–Proof Equilibria in a Global Emission Game When Players Are Impatient," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(3), pages 275-306, October.
    16. Finn Førsund & Eric NÆvdal, 1998. "Efficiency Gains Under Exchange-Rate Emission Trading," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 12(4), pages 403-423, December.
    17. Veijo Kaitala & Matti Pohjola & Olli Tahvonen, 1991. "An analysis of SO2 negotiations between Finland and the Soviet Union," Finnish Economic Papers, Finnish Economic Association, vol. 4(2), pages 104-112, Autumn.
    18. Anastasios Xepapadeas (ed.), 1996. "Economic Policy for the Environment and Natural Resources," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1012.
    19. Finus, Michael & Rundshagen, Bianca, 1998. "Toward a Positive Theory of Coalition Formation and Endogenous Instrumental Choice in Global Pollution Control," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 96(1-2), pages 145-186, July.
    20. Henk Folmer & Pierre Mouche & Shannon Ragland, 1993. "Interconnected games and international environmental problems," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 3(4), pages 313-335, August.
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