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Some evidence of congressional political markets in DOD personnel allocations across states

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  • Michael Stroup

Abstract

An empirical analysis of the distribution of Department of Defense (DOD) personnel (both military and civilian) across states is developed with a commonly used Public Choice model of resource allocation in a legislative setting. The model specification employs Congressional seniority, Congressional committee representation, Presidential electoral votes, and the per capita dollar value of prime defense contract awards to explain the variation of DOD personnel across states over time. The empirical analysis is performed over the last three decades, and the results indicate that this particular Public Choice legislative model performs well in explaining the variation in DOD personnel allocations across states. The results also provide some limited evidence of a possible political market between the states for DOD personnel allocations. This analysis has implications for future testing of whether the Base Realignment and Closure Commission (established in 1988 under President Reagan), and the Defense Base Closure and Realignment Commission of 1990 (under President Bush) were effective in significantly decreasing the legislative politics involved in the selection and approval process for base closure and realignment. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998

Suggested Citation

  • Michael Stroup, 1998. "Some evidence of congressional political markets in DOD personnel allocations across states," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 94(3), pages 241-254, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:94:y:1998:i:3:p:241-254
    DOI: 10.1023/A:1017923420545
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    1. Shepsle, Kenneth A. & Weingast, Barry R., 1987. "The Institutional Foundations of Committee Power," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(1), pages 85-104, March.
    2. Kenneth Shepsle & Barry Weingast, 1981. "Structure-induced equilibrium and legislative choice," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 37(3), pages 503-519, January.
    3. Peter Kennedy, 2003. "A Guide to Econometrics, 5th Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 5, volume 1, number 026261183x, April.
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    Cited by:

    1. Richard Cebula & Michael Toma, 2006. "Preliminary Evidence on the Allocation of U.S. Army Deaths from Operation Iraqi Freedom," Atlantic Economic Journal, Springer;International Atlantic Economic Society, vol. 34(1), pages 3-14, March.

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