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The Balanced Budget Amendment: Clarifying the Arguments

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  • Buchanan, James M

Abstract

From the perspective of a supporter, this paper responds to the several criticisms that have been raised to the proposed constitutional amendment to require budget balance. Economists have concentrated on the loss of fiscal flexibility. This objection is countered by reference to the political inefficacy of attempted budgetary manipulation. Lawyers have concentrated on problems of enforcement. This objection is countered by reference to observed respect to other constitutional rules. Copyright 1997 by Kluwer Academic Publishers

Suggested Citation

  • Buchanan, James M, 1997. "The Balanced Budget Amendment: Clarifying the Arguments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 117-138, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:90:y:1997:i:1-4:p:117-38
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    Cited by:

    1. Jairo Andrés Castaño Peña, 2020. "Las cláusulas de disciplina fiscal en las constituciones del Estado social de derecho : la sostenibilidad fiscal en Colombia y el principio de estabilidad presupuestaria en España," Books, Universidad Externado de Colombia, Facultad de Derecho, number 1186.
    2. Patrick Mardini, 2015. "The Endangered Classical Liberal Tradition in Lebanon: A General Description and Survey Results," Econ Journal Watch, Econ Journal Watch, vol. 12(2), pages 242–259-2, May.
    3. repec:cfe:wpcefa:2015_07 is not listed on IDEAS
    4. Marco Buti & Sylvester Eijffinger & Daniele Franco, 2003. "Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: grand design or internal adjustment?," European Economy - Economic Papers 2008 - 2015 180, Directorate General Economic and Financial Affairs (DG ECFIN), European Commission.
    5. Fabrizio Balassone & Daniele Franco, 2004. "EMU fiscal rules: new answers to old questions?," Chapters, in: Giuseppe Eusepi & Friedrich Schneider (ed.), Changing Institutions in the European Union, chapter 1, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    6. Daniele Bertolini, 2019. "Constitutionalizing Leviathan: A Critique of Buchanan’s Conception of Lawmaking," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 41-69, October.
    7. Feld, Lars P., 2018. "The quest for fiscal rules," Freiburg Discussion Papers on Constitutional Economics 18/09, Walter Eucken Institut e.V..
    8. Romina Boccia, 2019. "Apple Trees for Firewood: James Buchanan’s Case for a Balanced Budget Amendment in the Context of U.S. Fiscal Policy," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 7-23, October.
    9. Bingyuang Hsiung, 2001. "A Note on Earmarked Taxes," Public Finance Review, , vol. 29(3), pages 223-232, May.
    10. Karsten Mause & Friedrich Groeteke, 2012. "New constitutional “debt brakes” for Euroland? A question of institutional complementarity," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 23(4), pages 279-301, December.
    11. Daniel Mitchell, 2005. "Charles K. Rowley, William F. Shughart II, and Robert D. Tollison (Eds.), The economics of budget deficits. The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics 153, ed. by Mark Blaug. Cheltenh," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 122(3), pages 501-512, March.
    12. Belén Fernández Castro, "undated". "El Equilibrio Presupuestario: Las Restricciones Sobre El Déficit," Working Papers 30-04 Classification-JEL , Instituto de Estudios Fiscales.
    13. Marina Azzimonti-Renzo, 2013. "The political economy of balanced budget amendments," Business Review, Federal Reserve Bank of Philadelphia, issue Q1, pages 11-20.
    14. Vanberg, Georg, 2011. "Substance vs. procedure: Constitutional enforcement and constitutional choice," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 80(2), pages 309-318.
    15. Gerd Grözinger, 2004. "StaatsSchuld und SühneGeld: zur Beschränkung der öffentlichen Kreditaufnahme in Deutschland und Europa," Vierteljahrshefte zur Wirtschaftsforschung / Quarterly Journal of Economic Research, DIW Berlin, German Institute for Economic Research, vol. 73(3), pages 460-470.

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