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Apple Trees for Firewood: James Buchanan’s Case for a Balanced Budget Amendment in the Context of U.S. Fiscal Policy

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  • Romina Boccia

    (The Heritage Foundation)

Abstract

Throughout his academic career James Buchanan was deeply concerned about the proclivity of constitutional democracies to go into debt. He feared that the process of accumulating public debt would increase the tax burden on individuals to an extent that would eventually be fiscally unsustainable and subversive for liberty. This paper uses the example of the U.S. to illustrate, in concrete terms rather than abstract modeling, that Buchanan seems vindicated by the facts. To sideline him as a doomsayer and dismiss his balanced budget policy proposal out of hand would be inappropriate.

Suggested Citation

  • Romina Boccia, 2019. "Apple Trees for Firewood: James Buchanan’s Case for a Balanced Budget Amendment in the Context of U.S. Fiscal Policy," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 7-23, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:homoec:v:36:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s41412-019-00089-2
    DOI: 10.1007/s41412-019-00089-2
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Buchanan, James M, 1997. "The Balanced Budget Amendment: Clarifying the Arguments," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 90(1-4), pages 117-138, March.
    2. Inman, Robert P, 1982. "The Economic Case for Limits to Government," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 72(2), pages 176-183, May.
    3. William A. Niskanen, 1992. "The Case for a New Fiscal Constitution," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 6(2), pages 13-24, Spring.
    4. Congressional Budget Office, 2019. "Updated Budget Projections: 2019 to 2029," Reports 55151, Congressional Budget Office.
    5. Pierre Yared, 2019. "Rising Government Debt: Causes and Solutions for a Decades-Old Trend," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 33(2), pages 115-140, Spring.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Balanced budget amendment; Fiscal expansion; Keynesianism;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H1 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H6 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt

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