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Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: Grand Design or Internal Adjustment?

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  • Eijffinger, Sylvester
  • Franco, Daniele
  • Buti, Marco

Abstract

The Stability and Growth Pact is under fire. Problems have appeared in sticking to the rules. Proposals to reform the Pact or ditch it altogether abound. But is the Pact a flawed fiscal rule? Against established criteria for an ideal fiscal rule, its design and compliance mechanisms fare reasonably well. Where weaknesses are found, they tend to reflect trade-offs typical of supra-national arrangements. In the end, only a higher degree of fiscal integration would remove the inflexibility inherent in the recourse to predefined budgetary rules. This does not mean that the EU fiscal rules cannot be improved. Given the existing degree of political integration in EMU, however, internal adjustment rather than attempting to redesign the rules from scratch appears a more suitable way to bring about progress. Redefining the medium term budgetary target, improving transparency, tackling the pro-cyclical fiscal bias in good times, moving towards non-partisan application of the rules and improving transparency in the data can achieve both stronger discipline and higher flexibility.

Suggested Citation

  • Eijffinger, Sylvester & Franco, Daniele & Buti, Marco, 2003. "Revisiting the Stability and Growth Pact: Grand Design or Internal Adjustment?," CEPR Discussion Papers 3692, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    • Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:3692
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Fiscal policy; Fiscal rules; Economic and monetary union; Stability and growth pact;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
    • H30 - Public Economics - - Fiscal Policies and Behavior of Economic Agents - - - General
    • H60 - Public Economics - - National Budget, Deficit, and Debt - - - General
    • H70 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - General

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