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Constitutionalizing Leviathan: A Critique of Buchanan’s Conception of Lawmaking

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  • Daniele Bertolini

    (Ryerson University)

Abstract

This article examines James Buchanan’s conception of lawmaking, with specific respect to the institutional features he proposes in order to promote individual liberty. Buchanan’s constitutional framework is based on his perception of the nature of lawmaking and the sources of law. This paper argues that Buchanan’s often implied assumptions concerning the lawmaking process severely limits the theoretical strength of his constitutional framework and ultimately undermines the effectiveness of the institutional promoters of liberty he proposes. More specifically, Buchanan’s rigid legal positivism, combined with his peculiar form of political contractarianism, stifles his view of the sources of law; therefore, he is unable to provide a satisfactory normative account of the complex relationship between the lawmaking process and individual liberty within the constitutional order.

Suggested Citation

  • Daniele Bertolini, 2019. "Constitutionalizing Leviathan: A Critique of Buchanan’s Conception of Lawmaking," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 41-69, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:spr:homoec:v:36:y:2019:i:1:d:10.1007_s41412-019-00086-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s41412-019-00086-5
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    Cited by:

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    2. Hartmut Kliemt, 2023. "The logical foundations of constitutional democracy between legal positivism and natural law theory," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 195(3), pages 269-281, June.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Buchanan; Exchange; Constitutional political economy; Generality of the law; Lawmaking; Liberty;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • K40 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - General

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