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Abstentions and equilibrium in the electoral process

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  • Melvin Hinich
  • Peter Ordeshook

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Suggested Citation

  • Melvin Hinich & Peter Ordeshook, 1969. "Abstentions and equilibrium in the electoral process," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 81-106, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:7:y:1969:i:1:p:81-106
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718735
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    Cited by:

    1. Donald Wittman, 1984. "Multi-candidate equilibria," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 287-291, January.
    2. Rothbauer, Julia & Sieg, Gernot, 2010. "Quality standards for passenger trains: Political majorities and environmental costs," Economics Department Working Paper Series 8, Technische Universität Braunschweig, Economics Department.
    3. Campante, Filipe R. & Hojman, Daniel A., 2013. "Media and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 100(C), pages 79-92.
    4. Eli Noam, 1982. "Demand functions and the valuation of public goods," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 38(3), pages 271-280, January.
    5. Kovenock, Dan & Roberson, Brian, 2011. "Non-partisan ‘get-out-the-vote’ efforts and policy outcomes," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(4), pages 728-739.
    6. John Aldrich, 1983. "A spatial model with party activists: implications for electoral dynamics," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 41(1), pages 63-100, January.
    7. Hortala-Vallve, Rafael & Esteve-Volart, Berta, 2011. "Voter turnout and electoral competition in a multidimensional policy space," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 27(2), pages 376-384, June.
    8. Burton Abrams & Kenneth Lewis, 1987. "A median-voter model of economic regulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 52(2), pages 125-142, January.
    9. Larry Samuelson, 1984. "Electoral equilibria with restricted strategies," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 43(3), pages 307-327, January.
    10. Alesina, Alberto & Rosenthal, Howard, 1996. "A Theory of Divided Government," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 64(6), pages 1311-1341, November.
    11. Larry Samuelson, 1987. "A test of the revealed-preference phenomenon in congressional elections," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 54(2), pages 141-169, January.
    12. Matthew I. Jones & Antonio D. Sirianni & Feng Fu, 2022. "Polarization, abstention, and the median voter theorem," Palgrave Communications, Palgrave Macmillan, vol. 9(1), pages 1-12, December.
    13. Gary Cox, 1984. "Electoral equilibrium in double member districts," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 44(3), pages 443-451, January.
    14. Barbara Norrander & Bernard Grofman, 1988. "A rational choice model of citizen participation in high and low commitment electoral activities," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 57(2), pages 187-192, May.
    15. Mark M. Berger & Michael C. Munger & Richard F. Potthoff, 2000. "The Downsian Model Predicts Divergence," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 12(2), pages 228-240, April.
    16. Sacha Bourgeois-Gironde & João V. Ferreira, 2020. "Conflicted voters: A spatial voting model with multiple party identifications," Post-Print hal-02909682, HAL.
    17. Prummer, Anja, 2020. "Micro-targeting and polarization," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 188(C).
    18. Peter Coughlin, 1982. "Pareto optimality of policy proposals with probabilistic voting," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 39(3), pages 427-433, January.
    19. Jacobi, Tonja & Kontorovich, Eugene, 2015. "Why judges always vote," International Review of Law and Economics, Elsevier, vol. 43(C), pages 190-199.
    20. Keith T. Poole & Howard Rosenthal, 1994. "Congress and Railroad Regulation: 1874 to 1887," NBER Chapters, in: The Regulated Economy: A Historical Approach to Political Economy, pages 81-120, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

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