IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/copoec/v34y2023i3d10.1007_s10602-022-09380-y.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Selecting a voting method: the case for the Borda count

Author

Listed:
  • Donald G. Saari

    (University of California Irvine)

Abstract

Of importance when selecting a voting method is whether, on a regular basis, its outcomes accurately capture the intent of voters. A surprise is that very few procedures do this. Another desired feature is for a decision approach to assist groups in reaching a consensus (Sect. 5). As described, these goals are satisfied only with the Borda count. Addressing these objectives requires understanding what can go wrong, what causes voting difficulties, and how bad they can be. To avoid technicalities, all of this is illustrated with examples accompanied by references for readers wishing a complete analysis. As shown (Sects. 1–3), most problems reflect a loss of vital information. Understanding this feature assists in showing that the typical description of Arrow’s Theorem, “with three or more alternatives, no voting method is fair,” is not accurate (Sect. 2).

Suggested Citation

  • Donald G. Saari, 2023. "Selecting a voting method: the case for the Borda count," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 357-366, September.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:34:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-022-09380-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s10602-022-09380-y
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s10602-022-09380-y
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to the full text of the articles in this series is restricted.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s10602-022-09380-y?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Donald G. Saari, 2021. "Seeking consistency with paired comparisons: a systems approach," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 91(3), pages 377-402, October.
    2. Donald G. Saari & Maria M. Tataru, 1999. "The likelihood of dubious election outcomes," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 13(2), pages 345-363.
    3. Saari, Donald G, 1990. "Susceptibility to Manipulation," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 64(1), pages 21-41, January.
    4. Steven Brams & Peter Fishburn & Samuel Merrill, 1988. "The responsiveness of approval voting: Comments on Saari and Van Newenhizen," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 121-131, November.
    5. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
    6. Donald G. Saari, 2019. "Arrow, and unexpected consequences of his theorem," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 179(1), pages 133-144, April.
    7. Saari, Donald G., 1989. "A dictionary for voting paradoxes," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 48(2), pages 443-475, August.
    8. Donald Saari & Jill Newenhizen, 1988. "The problem of indeterminacy in approval, multiple, and truncated voting systems," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(2), pages 101-120, November.
    9. Tabarrok, Alexander, 2001. "President Perot or Fundamentals of Voting Theory Illustrated with the 1992 Election," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 106(3-4), pages 275-297, March.
    10. Norman Schofield, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(3), pages 575-594.
    11. Donald Saari, 2010. "Systematic analysis of multiple voting rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 34(2), pages 217-247, February.
    12. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Regenwetter, Michel & Grofman, Bernard & Marley, A. A. J., 2002. "On the model dependence of majority preference relations reconstructed from ballot or survey data," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 43(3), pages 451-466, July.
    2. Salvador Barberà & Dolors Berga & Bernardo Moreno, 2020. "Arrow on domain conditions: a fruitful road to travel," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 54(2), pages 237-258, March.
    3. Erdamar, Bora & Sanver, M. Remzi & Sato, Shin, 2017. "Evaluationwise strategy-proofness," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 106(C), pages 227-238.
    4. Peter Kurrild-Klitgaard, 2014. "Empirical social choice: an introduction," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(3), pages 297-310, March.
    5. Tomas J. McIntee, 2017. "A geometric model of sensitivity of multistage elections to change," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 49(1), pages 89-115, June.
    6. George Tsebelis, 2018. "How Can We Keep Direct Democracy and Avoid “Kolotoumba”," Homo Oeconomicus: Journal of Behavioral and Institutional Economics, Springer, vol. 35(1), pages 81-90, June.
    7. Arnaud Dellis & Mandar Oak, 2016. "Multiple votes, multiple candidacies and polarization," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 46(1), pages 1-38, January.
    8. Aki Lehtinen, 2007. "The Welfare Consequences of Strategic Voting in Two Commonly Used Parliamentary Agendas," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 63(1), pages 1-40, August.
    9. P. Hägg, 1997. "Theories on the Economics of Regulation: A Survey of the Literature from a European Perspective," European Journal of Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 4(4), pages 337-370, December.
    10. Krishna K Ladha, 2012. "Aristotle’s Politics: On Constitutions, Justice, Laws and Stability," Working papers 104, Indian Institute of Management Kozhikode.
    11. John Chamberlin, 1986. "Discovering manipulated social choices: The coincidence of cycles and manipulated outcomes," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 295-313, January.
    12. Le Breton, Michel & Truchon, Michel, 1997. "A Borda measure for social choice functions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 34(3), pages 249-272, October.
    13. Beigman, Eyal, 2010. "Simple games with many effective voters," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 68(1), pages 15-22, January.
    14. Jeff Strnad, 2024. "Economic DAO Governance: A Contestable Control Approach," Papers 2403.16980, arXiv.org, revised Jun 2024.
    15. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Working Papers hal-01065004, HAL.
    16. de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Ramer, Roald & Schram, Arthur, 2016. "Formal versus informal legislative bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 1-17.
    17. Truchon, Michel, 1998. "Figure Skating and the Theory of Social Choice," Cahiers de recherche 9814, Université Laval - Département d'économique.
    18. Derek Clark & Christian Riis, 2008. "Rational benevolence in small committees," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 134(3), pages 139-146, March.
    19. Kalandrakis, Anastassios, 2004. "A three-player dynamic majoritarian bargaining game," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 116(2), pages 294-322, June.
    20. Arkadii Slinko, 2006. "How the size of a coalition affects its chances to influence an election," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 26(1), pages 143-153, January.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    Borda count; Voting systems; Voting paradoxes;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:copoec:v:34:y:2023:i:3:d:10.1007_s10602-022-09380-y. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.