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Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability

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  • Prewitt, Kenneth

Abstract

A generally accepted interpretation of American politics today is associated with the “theory of electoral accountability.” The salient features of this theory are well known. The thesis was initially shaped in Schumpeter's classic work on democracy, and since has been elaborated by a generation of scholars. The elaboration, especially where grounded in empirical studies, has established (1) that the public, being largely apathetic about political matters and in any case ill-informed regarding public issues, cannot provide the necessary and sufficient conditions for the maintenance of democratic procedures; (2) that a liberal political and social elite are committed to the preservation of democratic forms, at least more committed than the average citizen; therefore, (3) what maintains the democratic tradition is not extensive public participation in political policy-making, but, instead, competition among elites whose behavior is regulated by periodic review procedures. Competition among elites and review by citizens of political leaders are provided by elections. Thus elections hold political leaders accountable to non-leaders.Writers associated with this general position have recently come under scholarly attack. The critique, directed at the first two assertions, can be reviewed briefly: although true that the public is not well-informed politically and is not actively engaged in political life, this is not to be attributed to the inherent traits of citizens so much as to the structure of political opportunities in the United States. Moreover, although true that research has detected among political leaders a greater commitment to democratic procedures than is the case for the ordinary citizen, this commitment is to procedures in which only the leaders participate.

Suggested Citation

  • Prewitt, Kenneth, 1970. "Political Ambitions, Volunteerism, and Electoral Accountability," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 64(1), pages 5-17, March.
  • Handle: RePEc:cup:apsrev:v:64:y:1970:i:01:p:5-17_12
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    Cited by:

    1. Anand Inbanathan, 2009. "Local Governance, Patronage and Accountability in Karnataka and Kerala," Working Papers 224, Institute for Social and Economic Change, Bangalore.
    2. D. Kenyon, 1984. "Preference revelation and supply response in the arena of local government," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 42(2), pages 147-160, January.
    3. Mansbridge, Jane, 2008. "A "Selection Model" of Political Representation," Working Paper Series rwp08-010, Harvard University, John F. Kennedy School of Government.

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