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Political coalition bargaining behaviour

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  • Jeffrey Callen
  • Leslie Roos

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Suggested Citation

  • Jeffrey Callen & Leslie Roos, 1977. "Political coalition bargaining behaviour," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 32(1), pages 1-10, December.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:32:y:1977:i:1:p:1-10
    DOI: 10.1007/BF01718666
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. John G. Cross, 1967. "Some theoretic characteristics of economic and political coalitions," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 11(2), pages 184-195, June.
    2. Browne, Eric C. & Franklin, Mark N., 1973. "Aspects of Coalition Payoffs in European Parliamentary Democracies," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 67(2), pages 453-469, June.
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