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From defunding to refunding police: institutions and the persistence of policing budgets

Author

Listed:
  • Tate Fegley

    (Montreat College)

  • Ilia Murtazashvili

    (University of Pittsburgh)

Abstract

Dozens of municipalities in the United States pledged to defund the police after Minneapolis police officers murdered George Floyd, an unarmed Black man, while he was in their custody. We first consider whether the municipalities that promised to defund the police actually did so. We find that they did not: municipalities that promised to defund the police temporarily reduced police budgets, only to later increase them beyond what they were previously. We then argue that two mechanisms—the electoral incentives of city politicians to provide jobs and services (what we call allocational politics) and the strength of police unions—explain why the predominant political equilibrium is one with protected police officers as a barrier to reform. We discuss several additional reforms suggested by public choice scholars interested in the problem of predatory policing.

Suggested Citation

  • Tate Fegley & Ilia Murtazashvili, 2023. "From defunding to refunding police: institutions and the persistence of policing budgets," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 196(1), pages 123-140, July.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:196:y:2023:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-023-01063-y
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-023-01063-y
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Policing; Defunding police; Neighborhood policing; Quasi-markets; Allocational politics;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
    • H76 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Other Expenditure Categories
    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General

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