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Military societies: self-governance and criminal justice in Indian country

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Listed:
  • Adam Crepelle

    (George Mason University)

  • Tate Fegley

    (University of Pittsburgh)

  • Ilia Murtazashvili

    (University of Pittsburgh)

Abstract

We argue that criminal justice institutions must be accessible to citizens, legitimate and have capacity to enforce law. Such was the case with the military societies of the Plains Indians: a system of criminal justice that predated the time of European contact and which remained a significant source of law and order in Indian country until the Indian Wars concluded at the end of the nineteenth century. Nonetheless, the federal government attempted to replace military societies with federal police starting circa 1850. Despite such attempts, we show that military societies remain an important institution for criminal justice on the contemporary Northern Cheyenne Reservation. When the federal government shirked on policing during the coronavirus pandemic, military societies took over important policing functions. This does not mean that traditional military societies should replace federal enforcement; rather, it shows that until the quality of federal policing improves, traditional institutions of criminal justice remain an important source of public safety in Indian country.

Suggested Citation

  • Adam Crepelle & Tate Fegley & Ilia Murtazashvili, 2024. "Military societies: self-governance and criminal justice in Indian country," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 199(3), pages 367-385, June.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:199:y:2024:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-022-01004-1
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-022-01004-1
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Criminal justice; Self-governance; Traditional institutions;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • B52 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - Current Heterodox Approaches - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary; Modern Monetary Theory;
    • H12 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Crisis Management
    • H71 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - State and Local Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue
    • K14 - Law and Economics - - Basic Areas of Law - - - Criminal Law

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