IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/kap/pubcho/v173y2017i3d10.1007_s11127-017-0481-5.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

The supermajority core of the US Senate and the failure to join the League of Nations

Author

Listed:
  • Gyung-Ho Jeong

    (The University of British Columbia)

Abstract

The failure of the United States to join the League of Nations is often considered to be an outcome of isolationist influence. The supermajority requirement of treaty ratification in the US Senate also is blamed for allowing a minority of isolationists to block the will of the majority that supported the treaty. To determine the cause of the failure, I analyze the Senate debate over the treaty using the concepts of the supermajority core and supermajority winset. Using all 157 votes on the treaty, I estimate senatorial positions and the locations of both the status quo and the treaty on the same metric space. From this analysis, I find that isolationists were not influential enough to block the ratification. Instead, President Wilson’s unwillingness to compromise is found to have played a critical role in the treaty’s defeat. The treaty’s defeat thus was not an indication of the power of isolationism. This study contributes to the growing body of literature that debunks claims about the dominance of isolationism in the interwar period. At the same time, the paper demonstrates how the core and winset concepts can be useful in answering substantive collective choice questions.

Suggested Citation

  • Gyung-Ho Jeong, 2017. "The supermajority core of the US Senate and the failure to join the League of Nations," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(3), pages 325-343, December.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:173:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0481-5
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-017-0481-5
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: http://link.springer.com/10.1007/s11127-017-0481-5
    File Function: Abstract
    Download Restriction: Access to full text is restricted to subscribers.

    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1007/s11127-017-0481-5?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Greenberg, Joseph, 1979. "Consistent Majority Rules over Compact Sets of Alternatives," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 47(3), pages 627-636, May.
    2. Schofield, Norman & Grofman, Bernard & Feld, Scott L., 1988. "The Core and the Stability of Group Choice in Spatial Voting Games," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 82(1), pages 195-211, March.
    3. Jeong, Gyung-Ho, 2008. "Testing the Predictions of the Multidimensional Spatial Voting Model with Roll Call Data," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 16(2), pages 179-196, April.
    4. Joshua D. Clinton & Adam Meirowitz, 2004. "Testing Explanations of Strategic Voting in Legislatures: A Reexamination of the Compromise of 1790," American Journal of Political Science, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 48(4), pages 675-689, October.
    5. Bianco, William T. & Jeliazkov, Ivan & Sened, Itai, 2004. "The Uncovered Set and the Limits of Legislative Action," Political Analysis, Cambridge University Press, vol. 12(3), pages 256-276, July.
    6. Norman Schofield, 1978. "Instability of Simple Dynamic Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 45(3), pages 575-594.
    7. Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), 2015. "Handbook of Social Choice and Voting," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 15584.
    8. Bernard Fensterwald JR, 1958. "The anatomy of American "isolationism" and expansionism. Part I," Journal of Conflict Resolution, Peace Science Society (International), vol. 2(2), pages 111-139, June.
    9. Hammond, Thomas H. & Miller, Gary J., 1987. "The Core of the Constitution," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 81(4), pages 1155-1174, December.
    10. McKelvey, Richard D., 1976. "Intransitivities in multidimensional voting models and some implications for agenda control," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 12(3), pages 472-482, June.
    11. Bianco, William T. & Sened, Itai, 2005. "Uncovering Evidence of Conditional Party Government: Reassessing Majority Party Influence in Congress and State Legislatures," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 99(3), pages 361-371, August.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. A. J. McGann, 2004. "The Tyranny of the Supermajority," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 16(1), pages 53-77, January.
    2. Bernard Grofman & Thomas Brunell & Scott Feld, 2012. "Towards a theory of bicameralism: the neglected contributions of the calculus of consent," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 152(1), pages 147-161, July.
    3. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," Working Papers hal-01065004, HAL.
    4. Daniel E. Ingberman & Robert P. Inman, 1987. "The Political Economy of Fiscal Policy," NBER Working Papers 2405, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    5. Jacob Bower-Bir & William Bianco & Nicholas D’Amico & Christopher Kam & Itai Sened & Regina Smyth, 2015. "Predicting majority rule: Evaluating the uncovered set and the strong point," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 27(4), pages 650-672, October.
    6. Thomas Bräuninger, 2007. "Stability in Spatial Voting Games with Restricted Preference Maximizing," Journal of Theoretical Politics, , vol. 19(2), pages 173-191, April.
    7. Nicholas R. Miller, 2015. "The spatial model of social choice and voting," Chapters, in: Jac C. Heckelman & Nicholas R. Miller (ed.), Handbook of Social Choice and Voting, chapter 10, pages 163-181, Edward Elgar Publishing.
    8. Tovey, Craig A., 2010. "The instability of instability of centered distributions," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 53-73, January.
    9. repec:hal:spmain:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
    10. Pierre-Guillaume Méon, 2006. "Majority voting with stochastic preferences: The whims of a committee are smaller than the whims of its members," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 17(3), pages 207-216, September.
    11. Moser, Peter, 1999. "The impact of legislative institutions on public policy: a survey," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 1-33, March.
    12. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," SciencePo Working papers Main hal-01065004, HAL.
    13. Keith Dougherty & Julian Edward, 2012. "Voting for Pareto optimality: a multidimensional analysis," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 151(3), pages 655-678, June.
    14. repec:spo:wpecon:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
    15. Amihai Glazer & Anthony McGann, 2005. "Direct Democracy and the Stability of State Policy," Working Papers 050615, University of California-Irvine, Department of Economics.
    16. Hervé Crès & Mich Tvede, 2001. "Proxy fights in incomplete markets: when majority voting and sidepayments are equivalent," SciencePo Working papers hal-01065004, HAL.
    17. Manow, Philip, 1994. "Strukturinduzierte Politikgleichgewichte: Das Gesundheitsstrukturgesetz (GSG) und seine Vorgänger," MPIfG Discussion Paper 94/5, Max Planck Institute for the Study of Societies.
    18. repec:hal:wpspec:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
    19. Tovey, Craig A., 2010. "A critique of distributional analysis in the spatial model," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 59(1), pages 88-101, January.
    20. repec:spo:wpmain:info:hdl:2441/10282 is not listed on IDEAS
    21. Scott Feld & Bernard Grofman & Nicholas Miller, 1988. "Centripetal forces in spatial voting: On the size of the Yolk," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 59(1), pages 37-50, October.
    22. Luigi Curini & Paolo Martelli, 2009. "Electoral Systems and Government Stability: A Simulation of 2006 Italian Policy Space," Czech Economic Review, Charles University Prague, Faculty of Social Sciences, Institute of Economic Studies, vol. 3(3), pages 305-322, October.
    23. de Groot Ruiz, Adrian & Ramer, Roald & Schram, Arthur, 2016. "Formal versus informal legislative bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 96(C), pages 1-17.
    24. Norman Schofield, 1986. "Existence of a ‘structurally stable’ equilibrium for a non-collegial voting rule," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 51(3), pages 267-284, January.

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:173:y:2017:i:3:d:10.1007_s11127-017-0481-5. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Sonal Shukla or Springer Nature Abstracting and Indexing (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://www.springer.com .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.