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Paths to victory in presidential elections: the setup power of noncompetitive states

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  • Steven J. Brams

    (New York University)

  • D. Marc Kilgour

    (Wilfrid Laurier University)

Abstract

In US presidential elections, voters in noncompetitive states seem not to count—and have zero power, according to standard measures of voting power—because they cannot influence the outcome in their states. But the electoral votes of these states are essential to a candidate’s victory, so they do count, but in a different way. We propose a simple model that enables us to measure the setup power of voters in noncompetitive states by modeling how these states structure the contest in the competitive states, as illustrated by the 2012, 2008, 2004, and 2000 presidential elections. We define three measures of setup power—winningness, vulnerability, and fragility—and show how they pinpoint the advantages of the candidate who leads in electoral votes of noncompetitive states. In fact, this candidate won in all four elections.

Suggested Citation

  • Steven J. Brams & D. Marc Kilgour, 2017. "Paths to victory in presidential elections: the setup power of noncompetitive states," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 170(1), pages 99-113, January.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:170:y:2017:i:1:d:10.1007_s11127-016-0386-8
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-016-0386-8
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    1. Myerson, Roger B., 1993. "Incentives to Cultivate Favored Minorities Under Alternative Electoral Systems," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(4), pages 856-869, December.
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    3. Brian Roberson, 2006. "The Colonel Blotto game," Economic Theory, Springer;Society for the Advancement of Economic Theory (SAET), vol. 29(1), pages 1-24, September.
    4. Dan S. Felsenthal & Moshé Machover, 1998. "The Measurement of Voting Power," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 1489.
    5. Shapley, L. S. & Shubik, Martin, 1954. "A Method for Evaluating the Distribution of Power in a Committee System," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 48(3), pages 787-792, September.
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    Cited by:

    1. Jonathan R. Cervas & Bernard Grofman, 2017. "Why noncompetitive states are so important for understanding the outcomes of competitive elections: the Electoral College 1868–2016," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 173(3), pages 251-265, December.

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