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Optimal central banker contracts and common agency: a comment

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  • Juan Campoy
  • Juan Negrete

Abstract

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Suggested Citation

  • Juan Campoy & Juan Negrete, 2008. "Optimal central banker contracts and common agency: a comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 197-206, October.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:137:y:2008:i:1:p:197-206
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-008-9320-z
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Georgios Chortareas & Stephen Miller, 2007. "The Walsh contract for central bankers proves optimal after all!," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 131(1), pages 243-247, April.
    2. Henry W. Chappell, Jr. & Rob Roy McGregor & Todd A. Vermilyea, 2005. "Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence from Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033305, April.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

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    Cited by:

    1. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    2. Margrethe Aanesen & Claire Armstrong, 2013. "Stakeholder Influence and Optimal Regulations: A Common-Agency Analysis of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Regulations," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(2), pages 320-338, June.
    3. Margrethe Aanesen & Claire W. Armstrong, 2016. "The Political Game of European Fisheries Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 745-763, April.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Central bank; Inflation bias; Common agency; E52; E58;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E52 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Monetary Policy
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies

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