IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/mhr/jinste/urnsici0932-4569(201306)1692_320siaora_2.0.tx_2-s.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Stakeholder Influence and Optimal Regulations: A Common-Agency Analysis of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Regulations

Author

Listed:
  • Margrethe Aanesen
  • Claire Armstrong

Abstract

One aspect of ecosystem-based management is to include new stakeholders. When an environmental NGO (ENGO) gets a say in the fisheries management, this will affect the authorities' optimal regulation. Combining a principal-agent model and a steady-state bioeconomic model, we show that under symmetric information the authorities will moderate their use of regulation as a response to the ENGO's increased influence. However, the aggregate of the authorities' and the ENGO's regulations will be stronger. On introducing asymmetric information, the regulation of the high-cost fishers relative to the low-cost fishers is weaker than under a single principal.

Suggested Citation

  • Margrethe Aanesen & Claire Armstrong, 2013. "Stakeholder Influence and Optimal Regulations: A Common-Agency Analysis of Ecosystem-Based Fisheries Regulations," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 169(2), pages 320-338, June.
    • Handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201306)169:2_320:siaora_2.0.tx_2-s
    DOI: 10.1628/093245613X13620416111245
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/en/article/stakeholder-influence-and-optimal-regulations-a-common-agency-analysis-of-ecosystemi-based-fisheries-regulations-101628093245613x13620416111245
    Download Restriction: Fulltext access is included for subscribers to the printed version.
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1628/093245613X13620416111245?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    As the access to this document is restricted, you may want to search for a different version of it.

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Nash, John, 1950. "The Bargaining Problem," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 18(2), pages 155-162, April.
    2. Juan Campoy & Juan Negrete, 2008. "Optimal central banker contracts and common agency: a comment," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 137(1), pages 197-206, October.
    3. Urs Steiner Brandt & Niels Vestergaard, 2006. "Illegal Landings: An Aggregate Catch Self-Reporting Mechanism," American Journal of Agricultural Economics, Agricultural and Applied Economics Association, vol. 88(4), pages 974-985.
    4. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2012. "Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 263-282, January.
    5. Georgios Chortareas & Stephen Miller, 2004. "Optimal Central Banker Contracts and Common Agency," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 121(1), pages 131-155, October.
    6. Frank Jensen & Niels Vestergaard, 2002. "A Principal-Agent Analysis of Fisheries," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 158(2), pages 276-285, June.
    7. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2002. "Moral hazard problems in fisheries regulation: the case of illegal landings and discard," Resource and Energy Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(4), pages 281-299, November.
    8. Avinash Dixit & Henrik Jensen, 2003. "Common Agency with Rational Expectations: Theory and Application to a Monetary Union," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 113(489), pages 539-549, July.
    9. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2007. "Asymmetric information and uncertainty: The usefulness of logbooks as a regulation measure," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(4), pages 815-827, September.
    10. Walsh, Carl E, 1995. "Optimal Contracts for Central Bankers," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 85(1), pages 150-167, March.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Jensen, Frank & Nøstbakken, Linda, 2016. "A corporate-crime perspective on fisheries: liability rules and non-compliance," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(3), pages 371-392, June.
    2. Margrethe Aanesen & Claire W. Armstrong, 2016. "The Political Game of European Fisheries Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 745-763, April.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Jensen, Frank & Nøstbakken, Linda, 2016. "A corporate-crime perspective on fisheries: liability rules and non-compliance," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 21(3), pages 371-392, June.
    2. Margrethe Aanesen & Claire W. Armstrong, 2016. "The Political Game of European Fisheries Management," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 63(4), pages 745-763, April.
    3. Abildtrup, Jens & Jensen, Frank, 2014. "The regulation of hunting: A game population based tax on hunters," Revue d'Etudes en Agriculture et Environnement, Editions NecPlus, vol. 95(03), pages 281-298, September.
    4. Jens Abildtrup & Frank Jensen, 2012. "The Regulation of Hunting: A Population Tax," IFRO Working Paper 2012/2, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    5. Graham Mallard, 2014. "Static Common Agency And Political Influence: An Evaluative Survey," Journal of Economic Surveys, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 28(1), pages 17-35, February.
    6. Margrethe Aanesen & Claire W. Armstrong, 2014. "The Implications of Environmental NGO Involvement in Fisheries Management," Land Economics, University of Wisconsin Press, vol. 90(3), pages 560-573.
    7. Giuseppe Ciccarone & Enrico Marchetti, 2012. "Optimal linear contracts under common agency and uncertain central bank preferences," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 150(1), pages 263-282, January.
    8. Jensen, Frank, 2008. "Uncertainty and asymmetric information: An overview," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(1), pages 89-103, January.
    9. Donato Masciandaro & Riccardo Russo, 2022. "Central Banks and Climate Policy: Unpleasant Trade–Offs? A Principal–Agent Approach," BAFFI CAREFIN Working Papers 22181, BAFFI CAREFIN, Centre for Applied Research on International Markets Banking Finance and Regulation, Universita' Bocconi, Milano, Italy.
    10. Lone Kronbak & Marko Lindroos, 2006. "An Enforcement-Coalition Model: Fishermen and Authorities Forming Coalitions," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 35(3), pages 169-194, November.
    11. Masciandaro, Donato, 2022. "Independence, conservatism, and beyond: Monetary policy, central bank governance and central banker preferences (1981–2021)," Journal of International Money and Finance, Elsevier, vol. 122(C).
    12. Jensen, Frank & Vestergaard, Niels, 2007. "Asymmetric information and uncertainty: The usefulness of logbooks as a regulation measure," Ecological Economics, Elsevier, vol. 63(4), pages 815-827, September.
    13. Nøstbakken, Linda, 2008. "Fisheries law enforcement--A survey of the economic literature," Marine Policy, Elsevier, vol. 32(3), pages 293-300, May.
    14. Enrico MARCHETTI & Giuseppe CICCARONE, 2008. "Linear Contracts, Common Agency and Central Bank Preference Uncertainty," EcoMod2008 23800083, EcoMod.
    15. Marine Charlotte André & Meixing Dai, 2017. "Can inflation contract discipline central bankers when agents are learning?," Working Papers of BETA 2017-25, Bureau d'Economie Théorique et Appliquée, UDS, Strasbourg.
    16. Urs Steiner Brandt & Frank Jensen & Lars Gårn Hansen & Niels Vestergaard, 2004. "Ratcheting in Renewable Resources Contracting," Working Papers 58/04, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Sociology, Environmental and Business Economics.
    17. Esteban Colla De Robertis, 2010. "Monetary Committee Size and Special Interest Influence," Documentos de Investigación - Research Papers 2, CEMLA.
    18. Andreas Freytag, 2001. "Does central bank independence reflect monetary commitment properly? Methodical considerations," BNL Quarterly Review, Banca Nazionale del Lavoro, vol. 54(217), pages 181-208.
    19. Jensen, Frank & Jacobsen, Jette Bredahl & Thorsen, Bo Jellesmark, 2016. "Designing hunting regulation under population uncertainty and self-reporting," Journal of Forest Economics, Elsevier, vol. 24(C), pages 157-171.
    20. Lars Gårn Hansen & Frank Jensen & Eirik S. Amundsen, 2014. "Regulating Groundwater Use in Developing Countries: A Feasible Instrument for Public Intervention," Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics (JITE), Mohr Siebeck, Tübingen, vol. 170(2), pages 317-335, June.

    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery
    • Q28 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Government Policy

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:mhr:jinste:urn:sici:0932-4569(201306)169:2_320:siaora_2.0.tx_2-s. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Thomas Wolpert (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://www.mohrsiebeck.com/jite .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.