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Network structures and heterogeneity in policy preferences at the FOMC

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  • Bhattacharjee, Arnab
  • Holly, Sean
  • Wasseja, Mustapha

Abstract

Transcripts from the US Federal Open Markets Committee provide, albeit with a lag, valuable information on the monetary policymaking process at the Federal Reserve Bank. We use the data compiled by Chappell et al. (2005b) on preferred interest rates (not votes) of individual FOMC members. Together with information on which monetary policy decisions are based, we use these preferred rates to understand decision making in the FOMC, focussing both on cross-member heterogeneity and interaction among the members of the committee. Our contribution is to provide a method of unearthing otherwise unobservable interactions between the members of the FOMC. We find substantial heterogeneity in the policy reaction function across members. Further, we identify significant interactions between individuals on the committee. The nature of these interdependencies tell us something about information sharing and strategic interactions within the FOMC and provide interesting comparisons with the Bank of England's Monetary Policy Committee.

Suggested Citation

  • Bhattacharjee, Arnab & Holly, Sean & Wasseja, Mustapha, 2024. "Network structures and heterogeneity in policy preferences at the FOMC," Accountancy, Economics, and Finance Working Papers 2024-10, Heriot-Watt University, Department of Accountancy, Economics, and Finance.
  • Handle: RePEc:zbw:hwuaef:303042
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Alexander Chudik & M. Hashem Pesaran & Elisa Tosetti, 2011. "Weak and strong cross‐section dependence and estimation of large panels," Econometrics Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 14(1), pages 45-90, February.
    2. Blinder, Alan S., 2007. "Monetary policy by committee: Why and how?," European Journal of Political Economy, Elsevier, vol. 23(1), pages 106-123, March.
    3. Burton A. Abrams, 2006. "How Richard Nixon Pressured Arthur Burns: Evidence from the Nixon Tapes," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, vol. 20(4), pages 177-188, Fall.
    4. Arnab Bhattacharjee & Sean Holly, 2013. "Understanding Interactions in Social Networks and Committees," Spatial Economic Analysis, Taylor & Francis Journals, vol. 8(1), pages 23-53, March.
    5. Bennani, Hamza & Kranz, Tobias & Neuenkirch, Matthias, 2018. "Disagreement between FOMC members and the Fed’s staff: New insights based on a counterfactual interest rate," Journal of Macroeconomics, Elsevier, vol. 58(C), pages 139-153.
    6. Henry W. Chappell, Jr. & Rob Roy McGregor & Todd A. Vermilyea, 2005. "Committee Decisions on Monetary Policy: Evidence from Historical Records of the Federal Open Market Committee," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262033305, April.
    7. Henry Chappell & Rob McGregor & Todd Vermilyea, 2007. "The persuasive power of a Committee Chairman: Arthur Burns and the FOMC," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 103-112, July.
    8. Chappell, Henry Jr. & Havrilesky, Thomas M. & McGregor, Rob Roy, 1995. "Policymakers, institutions, and central bank decisions," Journal of Economics and Business, Elsevier, vol. 47(2), pages 113-136, May.
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Monetary policy; Interest rates; FOMC decision making; Spatial Weights Matrix; Spatial Lag Model;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
    • E43 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Interest Rates: Determination, Term Structure, and Effects
    • E50 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - General
    • E58 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Monetary Policy, Central Banking, and the Supply of Money and Credit - - - Central Banks and Their Policies
    • C31 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Cross-Sectional Models; Spatial Models; Treatment Effect Models; Quantile Regressions; Social Interaction Models
    • C34 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Multiple or Simultaneous Equation Models; Multiple Variables - - - Truncated and Censored Models; Switching Regression Models

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