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Information Acquisition in Deliberative Democracies

Author

Listed:
  • Gerard Domènech-Gironell

    (Universitat de Barcelona, BEAT)

  • Caio Lorecchio

    (Universitat de Barcelona, BEAT)

  • Oriol Tejada

    (Universitat de Barcelona, BEAT)

Abstract

We examine the impact of deliberation on political learning and election outcomes. A rational, common-valued electorate votes under majority rule, after potentially acquiring costly private information and sharing it freely through public deliberation. Our findings suggest that deliberation can lead to free-riding on information gathering, but also encourage the emergence of informed political experts. Overall, deliberation may legitimize purely electoral outcomes and yield more accurate decisions. However, deliberation may also reduce electoral accuracy. We provide conditions for these results and contribute to the understanding of the strengths and limitations of deliberative democracies.

Suggested Citation

  • Gerard Domènech-Gironell & Caio Lorecchio & Oriol Tejada, 2024. "Information Acquisition in Deliberative Democracies," UB School of Economics Working Papers 2024/479, University of Barcelona School of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:ewp:wpaper:479web
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    File URL: https://hdl.handle.net/2445/217266
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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Elections; Information Acquisition; Deliberation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Lobbying, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
    • D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
    • D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search; Learning; Information and Knowledge; Communication; Belief; Unawareness

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