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War as Rent-Seeking: A Public Choice Perspective on the Pacific War

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Listed:
  • Zane Spindler
  • Brian Dollery

Abstract

Historical literature on the causes of the Pacific War generally focuses on either international relationships between the great powers in the interwar period or on the role of domestic interest groups in Japan, especially the Imperial Army and Navy. An alternative to these predominantly narrative approaches is to consider Japanese imperialism as explained by the public choice concept of rent seeking. Seeing both imperial expansions through armed conquest and domestic interest group rivalry as forms of rent-seeking behavior can provide a unifying perspective for understanding the Pacific War. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2007

Suggested Citation

  • Zane Spindler & Brian Dollery, 2007. "War as Rent-Seeking: A Public Choice Perspective on the Pacific War," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 7(1), pages 21-40, March.
    • Handle: RePEc:kap:porgrv:v:7:y:2007:i:1:p:21-40
    DOI: 10.1007/s11115-006-0021-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    3. Brian Dollery & Zane Spindler & Craig Parsons, 2004. "Nanshin: Budget-Maximizing Behavior, the Imperial Japanese Navy and the Origins of the Pacific War," Public Organization Review, Springer, vol. 4(2), pages 135-155, June.
    4. William A. Niskanen, 1994. "Bureaucracy And Public Economics," Books, Edward Elgar Publishing, number 333.
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    6. Zane Spindler & Xavier De Vanssay, 2003. "Constitutional Design for a Rent Seeking Society: The Voting Rule Choice Revisited," Constitutional Political Economy, Springer, vol. 14(2), pages 95-105, June.
    7. Olson, Mancur, 1993. "Dictatorship, Democracy, and Development," American Political Science Review, Cambridge University Press, vol. 87(3), pages 567-576, September.
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    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Imperialism; Interest groups; Pacific war; Public choice; Rent seeking; H0; H41; K4; N0; N45; O0;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H0 - Public Economics - - General
    • H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
    • K4 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior
    • N0 - Economic History - - General
    • N45 - Economic History - - Government, War, Law, International Relations, and Regulation - - - Asia including Middle East
    • O0 - Economic Development, Innovation, Technological Change, and Growth - - General

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