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Exchange, unanimity and consent: a defence of the public choice account of power

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  • John Meadowcroft

Abstract

An enduring criticism of public choice theory is that it does not adequately address the question of power in contemporary capitalist societies. In particular it is argued that the exchange paradigm and the principle of unanimity lead to a conservative defence of the unequal and unjust status quo of such societies. These criticisms are often presented as unanswered and unanswerable. Indeed, public choice scholars have tended to pursue their own research agendas rather than engage such criticisms. This article seeks to make good this lacuna by providing a defence of the public choice account of power. It is shown that within the public choice approach the exchange paradigm and the unanimity principle serve as idealized models against which to judge real world institutional arrangements. As such, these models serve as a basis for critique of contemporary capitalist societies in which all individuals may be subject to predation as a matter of routine. It is shown that the public choice account of power addresses the legitimization and limitation of power, whereas the critics of public choice in effect propose to allocate power to those deemed deserving. Hence, the public choice approach provides a basis for a genuinely consensual politics and exposes the fact that alternative conceptions of politics are fundamentally non-consensual. On this basis it is concluded that the public choice account of power in contemporary capitalist societies is superior to that offered by its critics. Copyright Springer Science+Business Media, LLC 2014

Suggested Citation

  • John Meadowcroft, 2014. "Exchange, unanimity and consent: a defence of the public choice account of power," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 158(1), pages 85-100, January.
  • Handle: RePEc:kap:pubcho:v:158:y:2014:i:1:p:85-100
    DOI: 10.1007/s11127-012-9925-0
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

    1. Nick Cowen, 2019. "Markets for rules: the promise and peril of blockchain distributed governance," Journal of Entrepreneurship and Public Policy, Emerald Group Publishing Limited, vol. 9(2), pages 213-226, September.
    2. Nick Cowen, 2018. "Mill’s radical end of laissez-faire: A review essay of the political economy of progress: John Stuart Mill and modern radicalism," The Review of Austrian Economics, Springer;Society for the Development of Austrian Economics, vol. 31(3), pages 373-386, September.
    3. John Meadowcroft, 2020. "Buchanan at the American Founding: the constitutional political economy of a republic of equals and unequals," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 183(3), pages 389-403, June.
    4. John Meadowcroft, 2016. "Commons, Anticommons and Public Choice: James Buchanan on Liberal Democracy," Economic Affairs, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 36(2), pages 224-228, June.
    5. Andrew Farrant, 2019. "What Should (Knightian) Economists Do? James M. Buchanan's 1980 Visit to Chile," Southern Economic Journal, John Wiley & Sons, vol. 85(3), pages 691-714, January.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Power; Exchange; Unanimity; Consent; Legitimacy; Constitutionalism; D63; D70; H10; P16;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • D63 - Microeconomics - - Welfare Economics - - - Equity, Justice, Inequality, and Other Normative Criteria and Measurement
    • D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
    • H10 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - General
    • P16 - Political Economy and Comparative Economic Systems - - Capitalist Economies - - - Capitalist Institutions; Welfare State

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